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Summary 
The dynamic relation between trust and control in managing alliances is getting a lot of attention in 
the scientific literature the last couple of decades and although a lot of research has been done in 
this area, the results are not yet conclusive. In order to contribute to the development of a theory on 
this dynamic relation I performed a longitudinal case study in which I analyzed how the evolution of 
(dis)trust between the alliance partners influenced the contents of the renewed contract, when they 
agreed to continue their relationship. Before performing this explorative, empirical research, I first 
developed a theoretical perspective in order to put the case study into a proper context for analysis. 
 
Considering the objective of my research, especially the theories regarding the design of (alliance) 
contracts, the development of trust and the relation between contracts and trust are relevant in 
order to develop a theoretical perspective. Transaction Cost Economics theory and derivatives 
mainly focus on finding an optimal organizational arrangement to govern a specific type of trans-
action. Although these theories play a paramount in the scientific literature about the management 
of alliances, they don’t pay much attention to nature, form and contents of contracts. Anderson and 
Dekker (2005) however demonstrated that transaction characteristics, like size and asset specifi-
city, and transaction partner characteristics, like competition and power, influence the extensive-
ness of contracts. In order to assess the development of trust I studied several researches in this 
area. Based on the results of these researches I decided to distinguish between interpersonal and 
interorganizational trust on the one hand and between intentional (affection, goodwill) and compe-
tence (cognition) trust on the other hand. About the relation between trust and contract there is a lot 
of debate between scholars, especially with regard to the questions whether trust and contract are 
complements or substitutes and whether trust precedes contract or vice versa. I studied two recent 
researches in this area. Coletti, Sedatole and Towry (2005) concluded there is a positive relation 
between control systems and trust, provided the results of the cooperation are visible for the alli-
ance partners (feedback). Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2005) however concluded 
that contracts must be interpreted within their dynamic social context. It’s not only about the mere 
presence and completeness of contracts, but also about the intentions with which the contract is 
drawn up and the actual use of the contract. 
 
To perform a longitudinal case study I selected an IT outsourcing contract that was signed in 2001 
for seven years and that was renewed and extended in 2005 for again seven years. I was given 
access to a set of Lotus Notes databases that contained all documentation regarding the out-
sourcing contracts collected by the IT service provider. The total size of these databases was more 
than 3 gigabytes and they contained about 5,000 Lotus Notes documents. In order to investigate 
these documents in a scientifically justified way I decided to use content analysis (Krippendorff, 
2004) as my main research technique. The objective of content analysis is to make replicable and 
valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use. The context for 
this research has been provided by the theoretical perspective as described in the previous sec-
tion. 
 
Before inferences can be drawn from the available texts within the defined context, the data must 
be prepared in a specific way. This data making process consists of four steps: unitizing, sampling, 
coding and reducing. I decided to use Lotus Notes documents as sampling unit and text fragments 
as coding unit. Because not all available documents have an equal relevance for answering my re-
search questions, I specifically sampled the documents that seem to contain information about the 
relationship between the outsourcing organization and the IT service provider (purposive sam-
pling). This sampling effort resulted in the selection of 294 documents, which I added to a spread-
sheet (rows) in chronological order. In order to code these documents I defined 13 variables (a.k.a. 
codes or concepts) based on the theoretical perspective and the knowledge I acquired about the 
contracts and the relationship during the document selection. After adding these variables to the 
spreadsheet (columns), I searched the sampled documents for relevant text fragments and added 
these to the appropriate cells in the spreadsheet. This effort resulted in 208 selected text fragments 
from 41 different Lotus Notes documents. Because the number of selected text fragments is too 
low to apply statistical reduction techniques, I decided to omit this step from the data making 
process. 
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The outsourcing organization and the IT service provider in this case study started negotiating 
about an outsourcing contract in 2001 based on a proposal from the IT service provider. After a 
joint verification project both organizations decided to sign the contract at the end of 2001. The 
seven-year contract had a total contract value of about 73M€. As could be expected from the con-
tract design theories I have studied, the contract was very extensive. Because the IT service pro-
vider had much more experience in this area, the provider led the negotiations and the signed 
contract was much more targeted to the competencies of the provider than to the needs of the 
outsourcing organization. After the contract was signed, the transition phase started. During this 
phase the execution of the IT operations of the outsourcing organization was done under the res-
ponsibility of the IT service provider. After half a year the service provider started working accord-
ing to the agreed service levels. Besides this business-as-usual, several projects were executed by 
the IT service provider and several contract amendments were agreed. The execution of the 
contract is however troublesome and the outsourcing organization is dissatisfied about the perform-
ance of the IT service provider, especially with regard to the procedural side. After signing the con-
tract, the outsourcing organization trusted the competence of the IT service provider and had a few 
doubts about the intentions of the provider. During the execution of the contract however, the trust 
of the outsourcing organization in the competence of the IT service provider is decreasing and this 
exacerbated the doubts about the provider’s trustworthiness. The provider does several attempts to 
turn the tide by planning and executing improvement programs, but despite these efforts, the pro-
vider wasn’t able to regain trust. Eventually the outsourcing organization and the IT service pro-
vider decided early 2005 to start negotiating about a renewed contract to break out of this down-
ward spiral of trust. These negotiations were successful and in May 2005 a new outsourcing con-
tract for seven years was signed with a total contract value of about 56,5M€. This new contract was 
as extensive as the first one and in the structure of the contract there weren’t many differences. 
From a customer satisfaction review held in December 2005 it appeared however that the 
outsourcing organization was satisfied about the performance of the IT service provider and 
expected further improvements in the years to come. 
 
Looking at the development of trust of the outsourcing organization in the IT service provider from 
the theoretical perspective, it can be concluded that both organizations have different views regard-
ing the use of the contract. The IT service provider mainly considers the outsourcing contract as a 
technical aid to manage the relationship. The outsourcing organization however is threatened by 
the extensiveness of the contract and considers this as a sign of distrust. Although I agree with 
Klein Woolthuis et al. that the intentions with which the contract is drawn up and the actual use of 
the contract are relevant, I would like to add an extra dimension to this. Not the actual intentions 
and use of the contract of an alliance partner are decisive for the development of trust, but how the 
other alliance partner perceives these intentions and use of the contract. In this case study the IT 
service provider even used the contract itself in trying to change the perception of the outsourcing 
organization about his intentions. Apparently, the IT service provider was successful in this attempt, 
because a new outsourcing contract was signed and the trust of the outsourcing organization in the 
competence and intentions of the IT service provider seemed to have restored. Although in this 
case the development of trust during the execution of the first outsourcing contract didn’t have 
much impact on the ‘letter’ of the new contract, it did impact the ‘spirit’ of the contract. This conclu-
sion points to some interesting options for further research. First, it might be investigated which 
factors influence the subjective belief regarding the intentions of the alliance partner. Once these 
factors are identified, I would suggest investigating how an alliance partner can appropriately 
influence the subjective belief of the alliance partner in its intensions with the usage of the contract. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Innovation, trust and control 
For IT organizations providing outsourcing services it’s very important for the long-term profitability 
of the outsourcing contracts, regarded as a specific form of an alliance between two organizations, 
to develop new business with the outsourcing organization besides just executing the contract. An 
approach to accomplish this is to adopt an attitude to the outsourcing organization as a partner in 
(information) technology instead of a mere supplier by learning the business of the outsourcing 
organization and then come up with innovative ideas on how to improve the efficiency and/or effec-
tiveness of this business by using IT. This learning and innovation process requires that the part-
ners trust each other so that they are willing to share their knowledge and ideas with each other 
(Nooteboom, 2004). Trust development is therefore a major task for the IT organization during the 
execution of the outsourcing contract and it’s important to know which factors influence this trust 
development. One of the factors that plays a paramount role in the trust development is the man-
agement control system used to manage the execution of the contract. Although the dynamic rela-
tion between trust and control in managing alliances is getting a lot of attention in the scientific liter-
ature lately and already a lot of research has been done in this area, the results are not yet conclu-
sive. The research project described in this document aims at offering a small contribution to the 
development of a theory on the dynamic relation between control and trust in the management of 
alliances. 
1.2 Thesis contents 
The next two chapters contain the logical and the technical design of the research project. Chapter 
2 starts with describing the background of the problem and then presents the objective of this re-
search and the research questions that need to be answered in order to accomplish this objective. 
After presenting ‘what’ has been researched, chapter 3 describes ‘how’ the research has been 
done. It describes the research strategy, the data collection and analysis method and some reflec-
tions on the methodological quality of the method. 
 
Starting from chapter 4 the results of the research project will be presented. First, the theoretical 
perspective that has been used to perform the empirical part of the research is described. The next 
chapter (5) then contains the results of the empirical part of the research. This includes a detailed 
description of the process of collecting and analyzing the data and the actual results of this process 
in the context of the theoretical perspective. The thesis wraps up, in chapter 6, with the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the analysis and some suggestions for further research. 
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2. Research plan 
This chapter describes the logical design of the research project. After defining the problem, the 
objective of the research project is presented. The chapter concludes with a section containing the 
research questions that need to be answered in order to accomplish the research objective. 
2.1 Background 
The management of alliances has been given a lot of attention in the accounting literature the last 
couple of decades. First, the discussion was focused on the reasons why alliances exist. In this dis-
cussion the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory plays a paramount role. The foundation of 
this theory has been laid by Coase (1937), while this theory has been elaborated by Williamson in 
an extensive trilogy (1975, 1985, 1996). The main purpose of TCE is to explain why some activities 
are more likely to be performed within firms (hierarchies), whereas other activities tend to be exe-
cuted within other forms of (economic) organization, such as markets or hybrids (e.g. a joint ven-
ture). This explanation is based on the premise that transaction characteristics determine its control 
needs and that an organization form is chosen, because its set of control devices offers the most 
efficient match to these needs. Speklé (2001) even takes this view a step beyond by defining nine 
control archetypes that differ in their problem-solving ability and in respect of cost, and are there-
fore appropriate for the governance of a specific kind of organizational activities, but not for others. 
 
Although TCE sounds very reasonable and has offered many useful insights in why different forms 
of economic organization exist, TCE and its derivatives also received a lot of criticism recently. 
Dekker (2004), for example, observed that TCE, due to its static nature, has taken little account of 
the social mechanisms of governance, while alliances are often embedded in a rich and influential 
social context. Nooteboom (2004) also mentions two well-known shortcomings in TCE, especially 
related to learning and innovation. First, Williamson (1999) admits that TCE makes only limited 
contact with the subject of learning as opposed to the ‘resource-based’ view (Barney, 1991; Das & 
Bing-Sheng Teng, 2000), another prevalent theory that tries to explain the reasons why alliances 
exist. According to Nooteboom, TCE is therefore more a theory of comparative statics than of the 
dynamics of alliances, in collaboration for innovation. Second, TCE claims that trust doesn’t yield a 
reliable safeguard against opportunism and is therefore not viable in markets. This ‘neglect’ of pos-
sibilities for trust however may yield excessive costs of contracting, while a detailed contract and 
close monitoring might seriously constrain the freedom and open-endedness of action that is cru-
cial especially when collaboration is aimed at innovation. This last objection to TCE gets a lot of 
support of other scholars that discuss the role of trust in (inter-)organizational relationships (e.g. 
Busco, Riccaboni & Scapens, 2006; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Möllering, Bachmann & Hee Lee, 2004; 
Nooteboom, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998) and/or the dyadic and dynamic relation be-
tween trust and control (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Das & Bing-Sheng Teng, 2001; 
Dekker, 2003/2004; Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom, 2005; Möllering, 2005; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002; Tomkins, 2001). Although much research already has been performed by these 
scholars (and many, many others), the results are not yet conclusive. A lot of additional research is 
necessary for the development of a theory on the relation between trust and control in the manage-
ment of (strategic) alliances. 
2.2 Problem definition 
Because the relation between trust and control in the management of alliances is too wide as a 
subject for a graduation research project, I had to narrow down this subject to come to a research-
able problem definition. I started to do this by taking up a suggestion for further research mentioned 
by Dekker (2004): how, over time, does the evolution of trust influence the governance structure 
and in particular the use of formal control mechanisms? The need for such longitudinal research 
into trust-control dynamics is not only mentioned by Dekker, but also by Bijlsma-Frankema and 
Costa (2005) and Salonen (2004). Because Dekker’s question was still too wide to answer within a 
graduation research project, I decided to take only the contract between the alliance partners, as a 
means of formal control, into account. I specifically focused on how the evolution of trust influences 
the contents of a renewed contract, when alliance partners agree to continue their relationship. 
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2.3 Research objective 
The objective of this research is to contribute to the development of a theory on the dynamic rela-
tion between trust and control in the management of alliances by analyzing how the evolution of 
(dis)trust between partners in an alliance influences the contents of a renewed contract, when 
alliance partners agree to continue their relationship. 
2.4 Research questions 
By studying the economic theory on designing contracts for alliances, the assessment of trust 
between persons and organizations and the relation between trust and contract, I developed a 
theoretical perspective for analyzing the dynamics between trust and contract in alliances aimed at 
the research objective mentioned in the previous section (a). Using this theoretical perspective the 
evolution of (dis)trust between partners in an alliance and the contents of the contracts of this 
alliance have been investigated (b). The findings of this investigation are my contribution to the 
development of a theory on the dynamic relation between trust and control in the management of 
alliances (c). 
Theory on designing
contracts for alliances
Theory about the 
assessment of trust
Theoretical perspec-
tive for trust-contract
dynamics in alliances
Contribution to trust-control
dynamics in (strategic) allian-
ces theory
Alliance
(a) (b) (c)
Theory on the relation
between trust and 
contract
 
By splitting this approach, the following main questions can be derived: 
 
1. What are, according to the current economic theory on designing contracts for alliances, the 
assessment of trust between persons and organizations and the relation between trust and 
contract, the relevant theoretical concepts to investigate alliances? 
 
2. What can be said about the evolution of (dis)trust between partners in an alliance and the 
contents of the contracts of this alliance with regard to the theoretical concepts found in the 
previous question? 
 
In the next sections these main questions will be split into several sub questions. 
2.4.1 Theoretical perspective 
The theoretical perspective for analyzing the dynamics between trust and contract in an alliance 
will consist of a list of relevant (theoretical) concepts. To find these concepts the following sub 
questions can be asked: 
 
1a. What does the theory on management control in general and Transaction Cost Economics 
(and derivatives) in particular learn on the design of contracts for alliances and what are the 
relevant criteria that ‘drive’ this design? 
1b. Which factors, according to the theory on trust between persons and organizations, are 
relevant in the assessment of the evolution of (dis)trust between partners in an alliance? 
1c. Which aspects should be studied in particular when investigating the influence of contracts on 
trust and vice versa in alliances? 
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2.4.2 Investigate alliance 
The investigation of the alliance will be largely driven by the relevant theoretical concepts found in 
answering the previous main question. Basically, every concept (or set of related concepts) will 
lead to a question on what can be said about the alliance under investigation related to that 
concept. This implies that this part of the research contains the following parts: 
 
2a. What can be said about the alliance under investigation with regard to the theoretical concepts 
found in answering the previous main question? 
2b. Which conclusions can be drawn from the answers of the previous sub question about the 
dynamic relation between contract and trust in the investigated alliance? 
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3. Methodological justification 
Where the previous chapter focuses on ‘what’ has been investigated in this research project, this 
chapter will describe what choices have been made in ‘how’ to perform this research. After de-
scribing the selection of the research strategy and the alliance to investigate, the choice for the 
data collection and analysis method is documented. The final section in this chapter contains some 
reflections on the methodological quality of this research. 
3.1 Research strategy 
Analyzing how the evolution of (dis)trust between partners in an alliance influences the contents of 
the contracts and vice versa, requires an in-depth study with a focus on relationships and process-
es in their natural setting (Denscombe, 2003). Therefore, I think a case study is the most appropri-
ate strategy for performing this research, which will also contain elements of desk research, historic 
research and grounded theory. I don’t think an experiment is possible in this situation, because 
there are no opportunities to control behavioral events. A survey would be less appropriate in this 
situation, because in a survey it’s not possible to pay attention to the complexity (context) of the 
situation, which is required to satisfy the research objective. 
 
A primary distinction in designing case studies is between single- and multiple-case studies (Yin, 
2003). Although the evidence from multiple cases would improve the external validity of this re-
search, I intend to perform a single-case study. The investigation of the dynamic relation between 
trust and contract by its nature requires a longitudinal case study and according to Yin (2003) this 
is a rationale for doing a single-case study. Besides that, within the time constraints for this re-
search project it’s not feasible to perform an in-depth, longitudinal study on multiple cases. 
3.2 Case selection 
Searching for a suitable case to investigate, according to the principle of theoretical sampling, I 
started within the company I work for. I’m working in an IT company that is a big player in the Dutch 
IT outsourcing business, which I joined about 10 years ago as part of an IT outsourcing contract. 
This implies I have a lot of affinity with alliances where an organization outsources (part of) its IT 
activities to a professional IT service provider and for me the choice to focus my research on this 
type of alliances is quite obvious. Despite the fact that I have been part of an outsourcing contract, I 
was never involved in the management of this or any other contract, so I don’t have any bias 
towards the relation between trust and control in managing IT outsourcing contracts and this is no 
impediment for an open-minded and critical attitude to this subject as required for scientific 
research. 
 
Based on conversations with colleagues working in this field, I understand that during the engage-
ment phase of the IT outsourcing contract life cycle the IT service provider is nearly always able to 
build a high level of trust in its competence and goodwill with the outsourcing organization and the 
outsourcing deal is positioned as a partnership. After the contract has been signed, however, it’s 
frequently observed that the trust level collapses and that the outsourcing organization sees the IT 
service provider as a mere supplier instead of a partner. Sometimes this state of distrust is final 
and it’s very likely in these situations that the contract is not renewed when the first contract period 
ends. In other situations the IT service provider is able to rebuild the trust level during the execution 
of the contract, often resulting in a continuation of the contract. During these discussions a specific 
IT outsourcing contract was mentioned that was signed in 2001 for seven years and which execu-
tion was very troublesome. To solve this situation the parties agreed to renegotiate the contract 
and in 2005 a new seven-year contract was signed with a revised scope. After this new contract 
had been signed, the execution of the contract was much less troubled and it seems the mutual 
level of trust has improved a lot since then. Because this alliance is very suitable in the context of 
my research objective, I decided to select this case for further research. 
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3.3 Data collection and analysis 
3.3.1 Sources of evidence 
Yin (2003) distinguishes six sources of evidence for conducting case studies: documents, archival 
records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artifacts. Because the 
selected case concerns a period in the past, it’s not possible to use direct observation and/or par-
ticipant-observation as a source of evidence. The other sources all have their relative strengths and 
weaknesses and should therefore be used in conjunction to develop converging lines of inquiry 
(source triangulation) and thus improving the validity of the research. 
 
For most case studies (open-ended) interviews are the most important source of evidence, while 
documents, archival records and physical artifacts are used to support and corroborate the evi-
dence found by interviewing persons. However, because this case study concerns a period of 
several years in the past, this approach is less appropriate. First, it’s likely that some key in-
formants are not available anymore for interview. The remaining informants might have problems 
recalling what exactly happened during the period being investigated and/or are probably biased in 
their explanations of causes and effects. On the other hand a lot of written information is collected 
in databases of the IT organization during the execution of the contract and the contract manage-
ment processes, e.g.: 
 
• The outsourcing contracts (the original and renewed ones) 
• Correspondence (letters and e-mail) regarding these contracts 
• Minutes of meetings 
• Results of customer satisfaction surveys 
• Submitted complaints and correspondence about the settlement of these 
 
Considering this, I decided to use this written information (documents, archival records and physi-
cal artifacts) as the source of evidence for this research. 
3.3.2 Method selection 
Looking for an appropriate way to analyze the written information collected about the outsourcing 
contract, I found two widely used research methods for analyzing this kind of evidence, ‘grounded 
theory’ and ‘content analysis’. 
 
The foundation of grounded theory was laid by Glaser and Strauss (1967). A grounded theory is a 
theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through the research pro-
cess (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Using this method the researcher begins with an area of study and 
allows the theory to emerge from the data. By asking effective questions, directed at advancing the 
understanding of the theoretical issues, and making theoretical comparisons, the data is ordered 
conceptually to a selective and specified set of properties and their dimensions. This conceptual 
ordering is then used to construct an explanatory scheme that systematically integrates various 
concepts through statements of relationships. The grounded theory method seems especially suit-
ed when one wants to develop a theory in a new area or in an area in which not much research has 
been performed. Theories derived from data will likely be very close to the empiricism, which is 
also one of the major drawbacks of this method. It seems to be very hard to build an explanatory 
theory, which one can use to derive answers on why and how questions, by making continuously 
theoretical comparisons. 
 
One of the main proponents of performing content analysis as a method of qualitative research is 
Krippendorff (2004). Like grounded theory, content analysis is an explorative process that is 
grounded in the empiricism and is aimed at making abductive inferences from texts to phenomena 
outside those texts. Krippendorff distinguishes three starting points from which researchers may 
enter a content analysis: text-driven, problem-driven and method-driven. A text-driven analysis 
shows a lot of resemblance with the grounded theory approach in that it is aimed at developing a 
theory by analyzing a set of texts in an unprecedented way (asking different questions and making 
other theoretical comparisons). In a method-driven analysis the use of the content analysis method 
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is a goal in itself. When, however, content analysis is used for a purposive examination of texts in 
trying to answer a set of research questions derived from epistemic problems, the approach is 
problem-driven. 
 
Because the objective of my research is to contribute to an explanatory theory on the dynamic rela-
tion between trust and control in the management of alliances related to an epistemic problem, a 
problem-driven content analysis seems the most appropriate way to analyze the available (written) 
material related to the selected outsourcing contract. 
3.3.3 Content analysis 
Krippendorff (2004) defines content analysis as a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use (p. 18). In this 
definition, texts (and also images, sounds, signs, symbols, etc.) are denoted as meaningful matter, 
that is data whose physical manifestation are secondary to what they mean to particular popula-
tions of people. This implies that contents analysts must look outside the physicality of texts to the 
meaning these texts have relative to particular contexts, discourses or purposes. Contents analysts 
must therefore explicitly choose the context in which they intend to make sense of a given text, be-
cause it is only within this clearly defined and understood context an analyst can draw inferences 
from available data to unobserved phenomena in order to answer the research questions. The con-
text of this research project is described in the next chapter of this thesis. 
 
Before inferences can be drawn from the available texts within the defined context, the data must 
be prepared in a specific way. Krippendorff (2004) calls this preparation the data making process 
(p. 83) and it consists of the following four steps: 
 
1. The available texts must be unitized by systematically distinguishing the segments of texts that 
are of interest to an analysis. 
2. The set of all possible units must then be sampled to a manageable subset of units that is con-
ceptually representative in order to economize on the research efforts. 
3. Consecutively the selected units must be coded into analyzable representations. 
4. Finally, the coded units need to be reduced to efficient representations that matter to the 
analysis. 
 
The results of the data making process for this research project are described in section 5.2 of this 
document. 
 
When the available texts have been processed into an analyzable form, the analyst can proceed to 
answer the research questions by making abductive inferences about phenomena that are not di-
rectly observable. Some authors (e.g. Maso & Smaling, 1998) call this analytical induction. In sec-
tion 5.3 the inferences drawn from the available texts are presented. These inferences are used in 
chapter 6 to define an answer to my last research question (see section 2.4.2, question 2b). 
3.4 Methodological quality 
Besides following the procedural steps described in the previous section to find appropriate an-
swers to the research questions, measures need to be planned to optimize the methodological 
quality of the research project. Methodological quality is, in short, the argumentative persuasive-
ness of the research conclusions (Maso & Smaling, 1998, p. 64). An essential condition to achieve 
sufficient methodological quality is to pursue methodological objectivity, which implies that the 
research conclusions must do justice to the object of study in relation with the research questions. 
Generally accepted standards in pursuit of methodological objectivity are reliability and validity. 
3.4.1 Reliability 
Reliability is the absence of random or unsystematic distortions of the object of study (Maso & 
Smaling, 1998, p. 68). In qualitative research reliability implies reproducibility of the interim and 
final results of a research project. In many qualitative research projects only virtual reproducibility 
can be accomplished, because the object of study is changing over time. As the main source of 
evidence for this research project is a set of documents collected during the execution of the 
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outsourcing contract, actual reproducibility of a large part of this research is possible and a high 
level of reliability is achievable. 
 
It is common to distinguish between internal and external reliability. Internal reliability is the relia-
bility within a research project and implies intersubjective consensus between the members of the 
research team and a certain extent of consistency of the researcher. Because I intend to do this 
research on my own, I only need to take care of my own consistency concerning the internal relia-
bility of this research. To achieve an appropriate level of consistency I will carefully separate de-
scriptions and interpretations and use common office applications (e.g. spreadsheets) for collecting 
and analyzing data. The internal reliability could be further improved by using sophisticated data 
analysis software and applying method triangulation, but these improvements are not feasible with-
in the time and budget constraints of this research. 
 
External reliability is the reproducibility of the whole research, including interim and final results, by 
other, independent researchers in the same situation, using the same research design, methods 
and techniques. This can be achieved by conducting the research in such a way that other re-
searchers can verify the course of the research and will be able to form their own opinion about the 
research (intersubjective traceability). To achieve an appropriate level of external reliability I will 
carefully describe in this report the social context of this research project and the chosen methods, 
techniques and concepts. I will also be explicit about the theoretical assumptions (see also chapter 
4) and keep an ‘audit trail’ during the research that can be critically examined by independent re-
searchers. 
3.4.2 Validity 
Validity is the absence of systematic distortions of the object of study. This is not only a charac-
teristic of the interim and final results of a research, but also of the design, methods and techniques 
of the research that led to those results. Like reliability, it’s common to distinguish between internal 
and external validity of a research project. 
 
Internal validity is validity within a research project and is especially concerning the soundness of 
the arguments (collected data) and the rationale (research design and analysis) that have led to the 
results of the research project. To achieve an appropriate level of internal validity I will carefully 
apply the research design and theoretical perspective presented in this report. I will also frequently 
have my supervisor critically examine the (interim) results to improve the internal validity (consen-
sual validation). 
 
External validity is usually regarded as the generalizability of the research conclusions to other 
persons, phenomena and situations than those of the research. Because I will only investigate one 
very specific case, it will be hard to make any generalizations based upon my research conclu-
sions. Therefore, I will avoid making any assertions about phenomena that haven’t been investi-
gated, so I don’t have to do justice to these phenomena. This implies that my research is an ex-
plorative one. 
3.4.3 Subjectivity 
Although reliability and validity are common standards for methodological quality, they only cover 
the pursuit for methodological objectivity partly as they are only related to research conclusions and 
procedures. The aim to not distort the object of study (systematically or unsystematically) doesn’t 
necessarily imply that sufficient justice will be done to this object of study. To have the object of 
study speak for itself the (qualitative) researcher should be personally involved and concerned with 
the reality under investigation. As such, the subjective effort of the researcher can contribute signifi-
cantly in the pursuit of methodological objectivity. This contribution, however, will only be positive 
when the researcher can find a right balance between involvement and distance, has an open mind 
and heart, has self-insight and is able to ‘role taking’ (Maso & Smaling, 1998, p. 80). Although I am 
a novice to scientific research, I am conscious of these qualifications and will take these to heart. I 
think the fact that I was once subject of an IT outsourcing contract, but was never involved in exe-
cuting or managing such contracts (see section 3.2) at least puts me in a good position. 
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4. Theoretical perspective 
In order to define the context for performing the content analysis (see chapter 5) I have studied 
some literature about contracts, trust and their relation. I used the three sub questions of my first 
main question (see section 2.4.1) to guide this effort: 
 
a. What does the theory on management control in general and Transaction Cost Economics 
(and derivatives) in particular learn on the design of contracts for alliances and what are the 
relevant criteria that ‘drive’ this design? 
b. Which factors, according to the theory on trust between persons and organizations, are 
relevant in the assessment of the evolution of (dis)trust between partners in an alliance? 
c. Which aspects should be studied in particular when investigating the influence of contracts on 
trust and vice versa in alliances? 
 
The three main sections of this chapter each address one of these sub questions. Section 5.2.3.1 
describes how the theoretical perspective documented in this chapter has been used to support the 
content analysis. 
4.1 Designing contracts for alliances 
Because the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory plays a paramount role in the literature 
about the management of alliances, this theory will be discussed first. TCE doesn’t pay much 
attention to nature, form, contents and implications of contracts though, so subsequently I will 
discuss some recent literature in this area. 
4.1.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
According to Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1975/1985/1996) a specific organizational 
arrangement is chosen to govern a specific transaction, because that arrangement offers some 
distinctive set of control devices that is uniquely tailored to the control needs of that transaction. In 
order to choose the proper arrangements Transaction Cost Economics scores transactions on 
three dimensions: (1) the degree of asset specificity of the transaction; (2) its uncertainty (including 
complexity); and (3) its frequency. Uncertainty and complexity inhibit the ex ante specification of 
outcomes of performed activities. This problem is exacerbated by the bounded rationality of human 
beings. Therefore, contracts are bound to be incomplete, and increasingly so when uncertainty and 
complexity rise. Asset specificity refers to the size of the opportunity losses that will be incurred in 
case of premature termination of the contract. The value of these losses is exposed to the risk of 
opportunistic expropriation and hence provides a measure of the potential gains from opportunism 
and of the intensity of the incentive to engage in such behavior. The combination of these transac-
tion and human characteristics might lead to a situation of information impactedness, which exists 
when information relevant to the transaction is known to one or more parties but cannot costlessly 
be obtained by others. This situation can be exploited during contract execution in an attempt to in-
crease one’s share of the gains from the transaction. The role of frequency is that it exacerbates 
the contracting problems associated with the other dimensions, adding to the pressure to find a 
solution. 
 
Economic factors try to cope with these problems by adopting appropriate organizational arrange-
ments to govern their transactions. At a generic level, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) defines 
three distinct modes of governance: (1) markets; (2) hybrids; and (3) hierarchies or internalization. 
These alternative governance structures differ in the control mechanisms they employ to safeguard 
contract execution and to achieve successful adaptation. However, these alternatives also differ in 
respect of costs. TCE’s main theme is that transactions (which differ in asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency) are aligned with governance structures (which differ in their costs and competen-
cies) in a discriminating, economizing way. Market control is to be expected for transactions that 
score low on asset specificity. Rising asset specificity, however, impedes the smooth functioning of 
the market and alternative governance devices are now needed to protect the transaction against 
opportunistic breach of contract and uncooperative gap-filling behavior. The hybrid mode of gov-
ernance may offer these. Hybrid governance structures provide additional transaction-specific safe-
guards, such as hostage arrangements and specialized dispute settlement institutions. In condi-
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tions of substantial uncertainty however, the minimum level of contractual detail cannot always be 
provided. Moreover, these safeguards are usually less than perfect, which may be problematic 
when asset specificity rises. In these situations governance structures that more reliably secure 
adaptive, cooperative attitudes and actions when it comes to filling the contractual gaps are neces-
sary and hierarchical governance may be appropriate. 
 
Speklé (2001) used Transaction Cost Economics to explain management control structure variety. 
He proposes a framework that explicates the link between various archetypical configurations of 
control devices and the activities they are expected to control. In this framework, the nature of the 
organizational activities and the required contributions from organizational participants are defined 
along three dimensions: (1) the extent of programmability (uncertainty); (2) the degree of asset 
specificity or idiosyncrasy; and (3) the intensity of ex post information impactedness. These 
attributes are associated with distinctive control problems that need to be dealt with. The control 
archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, which makes them appropriate for the governance 
of some contributions, but not for others. Moreover, they differ in cost, and the framework explains 
the alignment of a contribution with a control archetype be delineating the efficiency properties of 
the match. Based on the possible combinations of values on these three dimensions, Speklé has 
defined the following control archetypes: 
 
Ex ante 
programmability of 
contributions 
Idiosyncrasy Impactedness of 
information for post 
hoc performance 
assessment 
Control archetypes 
High Low  Market Control – Control based on competition 
 Moderate  Arm’s Length Control (hierarchical or hybrid) – (Quasi) 
independent: outcome control based on market-derived 
standards or predefined contractual provisions 
 High  Machine Control – Administrative control based on codification 
of behaviour (action oriented) or predefined performance 
targets (result oriented) 
Low Low  Market Control – Control based on competition 
 Moderate Low Exploratory Control (hierarchical or hybrid) – Control based on 
converging insights that accrue and spread during the process. 
Convergence either administratively induced or based on 
market-disciplined information sharing 
  High Boundary Control (hierarchical or market-based) – Market 
procurement if reputation effects are reliable; otherwise 
proscriptive control of administrative origins 
 High Low Exploratory Control (hierarchical) – Administrative control 
based on converging insights that accrue and spread during 
the process 
  High Boundary Control (hierarchical) – Administrative control 
through interdictions, emphasizing behaviour to be avoided 
 
4.1.2 Contract design 
Transaction Cost Economics and derivatives like Speklé’s control archetypes emphasize the insti-
tutional factors related to contracting. These theories try to define the conditions in which contracts 
can best be established and executed. Less attention in these theories is paid to nature, form, con-
tents and implications of the contracts themselves. A common theory that especially focuses on the 
contracts themselves is the agency theory. This theory analyses contractual relationships between 
a principal and an agent. In such relationships the agent makes decisions and executes tasks for or 
on behalf of the principal. In exchange, the agent receives a compensation that is more or less 
related to the extent in which the objectives of the assignment are accomplished. Unfortunately, the 
contribution of the agency theory in management control theory remains fragmented, because 
agency theorists mainly focus on a limited number of well-specified elements of management 
control systems, which are suitable for mathematical modeling. 
 
A recent study of Anderson and Dekker (2005) examined the association between the architecture 
of transaction contracts and characteristics of the transactions that they govern. Their study tests 
three sets of hypotheses on a comprehensive database on 858 transactions for information tech-
nology products and accompanying services. The first hypothesis is that the extensiveness of the 
contract is positively associated with transaction hazards. Consistent with theory, transaction haz-
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ards are represented by transaction characteristics (e.g., size, specificity, uncertainty, and task 
complexity) and transaction partner characteristics (e.g., supplier power and competition). Ander-
son and Dekker also expected the structure of the contracts to differ in response to anticipated 
transaction hazards; specifically, different levers of control are employed to mitigate different per-
ceived hazards. The second set of hypotheses concerns contract incompleteness. Anderson and 
Dekker considered whether costs of contracting increase in contract extensiveness, whether con-
tracting costs differ for different management control dimensions, and whether transaction charac-
teristics are positively related to ex post transaction problems even in the presence of mutually 
agreed-upon contracts. The final hypothesis was that the incidence and severity of ex post trans-
action problems will be accompanied by misalignment between transaction hazards and the man-
agement control structure. Two possible manifestations of misalignment were considered: (1) the 
absence of an association between transaction characteristics and the contract structure and (2) 
significant differences in the associations between transaction characteristics and the contract 
structure, compared to transactions without severe problems. The relations estimated between 
transaction and supplier characteristics, contract structure, and subsequent performance (expected 
signs of estimated relations are in parentheses) are depicted by Anderson and Dekker in the 
following diagram: 
 
Transaction characteristics
Uncertainty (+)
Size (+)
Asset specificity (+)
Task complexity (+)
Transaction partner characteristics
Competition (-)
Power (+)
Contract design
Contract extensiveness (+)
Contract structure (+)
1. Rights assignment
2. Product & price
3. After-sales service
4. Legal recourse
Costs of contracting
Ex post transaction 
problems
Misalignment (+) between transaction hazards
and the formal control structure
 
 
Because I’m mainly interested in the factors that determine the design of the contract, I will focus 
on the constructs Anderson and Dekker use to measure the transaction (partner) characteristics: 
 
1. Uncertainty reflects the difficulty of defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products and 
services for which the parties are contracting. 
a. Difficulty of assessing quality of supplier’s product at delivery (1=very easy, 5=very difficult) 
b. Difficulty of comparing different suppliers’ products (1=very easy, 5=very difficult) 
c. Difficulty of comparing the price/quality ratio of different suppliers’ products (1=very easy, 
5=very difficult) 
2. Transaction size is an indicator of the exposure of both parties to opportunistic holdup. 
a. Initial contract price to supplier: less than $15,000 (1), $30,000 (2), $60,000 (3), $120,000 (4) 
and more than $120,000 (5). 
3. Asset specificity refers to exposure of the transacting parties to ex post opportunistic holdup 
that is caused by significant investments in human or physical assets that have little or no value 
outside of the transaction. 
a. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would have been the loss in terms of time 
and money associated with training your personnel (1=very small, 5=very large) 
b. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would have been the loss in terms of time 
and money associated with data entry (1=very small, 5=very large) 
c. If the product failed and had to be replaced, what would have been the loss in terms of time 
and money associated with idle production (1=very small, 5=very large) 
4. Complexity is common when both parties to a transaction contribute complex components or 
services that interact in unpredictable ways to produce the desired final product or service. 
a. Number of products/services bought (select from list of 18 possibilities, see next question) 
b. Product complexity: Standard software, Personal computers, Work stations, Side equipment, 
Cabling (1), Network configuration, Minisystem, Mainframe, Computer-controlled machines 
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(2), Branch-specific software, Training, Instruction, Documentation (3), Customized software, 
Consulting, Accompaniment (4), Design, Tailor-made software (5). 
5. The intensity of competition in the supplier’s product market at the time that the transaction 
was initiated is a force that reduces transaction hazards. 
a. Number of potential suppliers at time of purchase (1=very small, 5=very large) 
b. Number of alternative products at time of purchase (1=very small, 5=very large) 
6. The ex ante bilateral power differential between the buyer and supplier is captured by a single 
survey item: 
a. How large did you estimate the dependence of your firm on the supplier before the purchase 
(1=very small, 5=very large) 
4.2 Evolution of trust 
Möllering, Bachmann and Hee Lee (2004) show an overview of indicative items that have been 
used in four target-related surveys on trust(worthiness). Of these four surveys I didn’t look into the 
research of Larzelere and Huston (1980) as this research focuses on very close personal relation-
ships. The three other surveys are discussed below. Following Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone 
(1998), who pay special attention to boundary spanners, I also discuss the research of Currall and 
Judge (1995), which focuses on assessing trust between these boundary role persons. 
4.2.1 Interpersonal trust 
A study of McAllister (1995) addressed the nature and functioning of relationships of interpersonal 
trust among managers and professionals in organizations, the factors influencing trust's develop-
ment, and the implications of trust for behavior and performance. McAllister defines interpersonal 
trust as the extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the basis of the words, 
actions and decisions of another. He recognizes that interpersonal trust has cognitive and affective 
foundations, both with their own antecedents. To assess affect- and cognition-based trust levels for 
his study, McAllister developed a new measure consisting of 11 items, 6 assessing levels of cogni-
tion-based trust, and 5 assessing affect-based trust. Respondents indicated on a scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) their agreement with various statements about a 
specific peer at work. 
 
Affect-based trust 
• We have a sharing relationship. We can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes. 
• I can talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am having at work and know that (s)he will 
want to listen. 
• We would both feel a sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no longer work 
together. 
• If I shared my problems with this person, I know (s)he would respond constructively and 
caringly. 
• I would have to say that we have both made considerable emotional investments in our working 
relationship. 
 
Cognition-based trust 
• This person approaches his/her job with professionalism and dedication. 
• Given this person's track record, I see no reason to doubt his/her competence and preparation 
for the job. 
• I can rely on this person not to make my job more difficult by careless work. 
• Most people, even those who aren't close friends of this individual, trust and respect him/her as 
a coworker. 
• Other work associates of mine who must interact with this individual consider him/her to be 
trustworthy. 
• If people know more about this individual and his/her background, they would be more 
concerned and monitor his/her performance more closely. 
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4.2.2 Organizational trust 
Cummings and Bromiley (1996) developed and validated a measure of organizational trust: the de-
gree of trust between units of an organization or between organizations. They define trust as an in-
dividual’s belief or a common belief among a group of individuals that another individual or group 
(a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit or implicit, 
(b) is honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) does not take exces-
sive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available. Besides these three dimensions 
of trust, Cummings and Bromiley based their theory and measurement of trust as a belief on the 
assumption that, as a belief, trust should be assessed across three components. These are trust as 
an affective state, as a cognition, and as an intended behavior. 
 
The dimensions and components of trust yielded a three-by-three matrix as the definitional struc-
ture of trust, which was the main vehicle for developing the survey items for their Organizational 
Trust Inventory (OTI). Next to the full OTI, which may be overly long for many uses, Cummings and 
Bromiley also designed and assessed a short form of the OTI: 
 
Affective state 
• We feel that ……. negotiates with us honestly. 
• We feel that ……. will keep its word. 
• We think ……. does not mislead us. 
• We feel that ……. tries to get out of its commitments. 
• We feel that ……. negotiates joint expectations fairly. 
• We feel that ……. takes advantage of people who are vulnerable. 
 
Cognition 
• We think the people in ……. tell the truth in negotiations. 
• We think that ……. meets its negotiated obligations to our department. 
• In our opinion, ……. is reliable. 
• We think that the people in ……. succeed by stepping on other people. 
• We feel that ……. tries to get the upper hand. 
• We think that ……. takes advantage of our problems. 
4.2.3 Interpersonal and interorganizational trust 
Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998) take up a fundamental challenge in conceptualizing the role of 
trust in economic exchange by extending an inherently individual-level phenomenon to the organi-
zational level of analysis. They propose that institutionalized practices and routines for dealing with 
a partner organization create a stable context within which interorganizational and interpersonal 
trust develop and there is a reciprocal relation between trust at these two levels of analysis. For 
their research they used the term interpersonal trust to refer to the extent of a boundary-spanning 
agent’s trust in her counterpart in the partner organization. The term interorganizational trust is 
defined as the extent of trust placed in the partner organization by the members of a focal organi-
zation. 
 
Zaheer et al. argue that the connection between interpersonal and interorganizational trust is based 
on institutionalizing processes. These processes codify informal commitments made by individual 
boundary spanners, which over time become established and taken-for-granted organizational 
structures and routines. Norms from the interorganizational relationship are internalized and recre-
ated in boundary spanners’ interpersonal trust orientations toward each other in the process of con-
ducting exchange. At the same time, interpersonal trust becomes reinstitutionalized and boundary 
spanners’ trust orientation in turn influences the orientation of other organizational members toward 
the partner organization. To validate this hypothesis and several other hypotheses (regarding the 
relation between interorganizational trust, interpersonal trust, costs of negotiation, level of conflict 
and performance) Zaheer et al. conducted a survey among electrical equipment manufacturers and 
their component suppliers. To operationalize their theoretical constructs they used the following 
items and scales to measure interorganizational and interpersonal trust: 
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Interorganizational trust 
• Supplier X has always been evenhanded in its negotiations with us. 
• Supplier X may use opportunities that arise to profit at our expense. 
• Based on past experience, we cannot with complete confidence rely on supplier X to keep 
promises made to us. 
• We are hesitant to transact with supplier X when the specifications are vague. 
• Supplier X is trustworthy. 
 
Interpersonal trust 
• My contact person has always been evenhanded in negotiations with me. 
• I know how my contact person is going to act. S/he can always be counted on to act as I expect. 
• My contact person is trustworthy. 
• I have faith in my contact person to look out for my interests even when it is costly to do so. 
• I would feel a sense of betrayal if my contact person’s performance was below my expectations. 
 
Zaheer et al. also measured asset specificity and uncertainty, because these have been theorized 
to influence the governance structure, which is the framework within which firms negotiate, execute 
and monitor exchange agreements (see also section 4.1.2): 
 
Asset specificity 
• Our production system has been tailored to meet the requirements of dealing with supplier X. 
• Gearing up to deal with supplier X requires highly specialized tools and equipment. 
• Our production system has been tailored to using the particular items bought from supplier X. 
• We have made significant investments in tools and equipment dedicated to our relationship with 
supplier X. 
 
Uncertainty 
How would you describe the supply of the component purchased from supplier X compared to 
other similar products (not only provided by supplier X)? 
• Stable availability 
• Easy to monitor technological trends 
• Stable industry volume 
• Accurate sales forecasts 
4.2.4 Boundary role person trust 
Defining trust as an individual’s behavioral reliance on another person under a condition of risk, 
Currall and Judge (1995) developed and tested the construct validity of a questionnaire measure 
that assessed trust between the individuals who provide the linking mechanism across organiza-
tional boundaries, namely boundary role persons (BRPs). Based on existing literature, four dimen-
sions of BRP trust were identified: 
 
1. Open and honest communication with the counterpart BRP. BRPs manifest trust by disclosing 
important yet potentially self-damaging information, being accurate when communicating, and 
not filtering or distorting information. 
 
2. Entering an informal agreement with the counterpart BRP. Entering an informal agreement 
manifests trust because the absence of a document creates risk stemming from possible 
untrustworthiness by the other BRP. 
 
3. Maintaining surveillance over the counterpart BRP. If a BRP has little trust in the other BRP, he 
or she will feel the need to keep careful watch over that person. 
 
4. Task coordination with the counterpart BRP. BRPs manifest trust in each other when they 
coordinate tasks they cannot carry out independently. 
 
Within each of the communication, informal agreement and surveillance dimensions Currall and 
Judge developed survey items that tapped trusting behaviors common to all BRPs. Because trust-
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ing behaviors within the task coordination dimension vary based on the organizational context, the 
task coordination items were developed to fit the context in which their study was carried out. They 
advise researchers wishing to measure BRP trust in organizational contexts other than the one 
they have studied and for whom it’s not feasible to develop their own task coordination items, to 
only use the items in the first three dimensions. Instructions for the items read: “Answer the 
questions in terms of what you would actually do in dealing with the (counterpart BRP) . . . .” The 
response format was: 1 = extremely unlikely, 2 = quite unlikely, 3 = slightly unlikely, 4 = neither, 5 = 
slightly likely, 6 = quite likely, and 7 = extremely likely. 
 
Communication Dimension Items 
• Think carefully before telling the (counterpart BRP) my opinions. 
• Give the (counterpart BRP) all known and relevant information about important issues even if 
there is a possibility that it might jeopardize the (respondent's organization). 
• Give the (counterpart BRP) all known and relevant information about important issues even if 
there is a possibility that it might jeopardize my job as the (respondent's job). 
• Minimize the information I give to the (counter part BRP). 
• Deliberately withhold some information when communicating with the (counterpart BRP). 
 
Informal Agreement Dimension Items 
• Enter into an agreement with the (counterpart BRP) even if his/her future obligations concerning 
the agreement are not explicitly stated. 
• Enter into an agreement with the (counterpart BRP) even if I think other people might try to 
persuade him/her to break it. 
• Enter into an agreement with the (counterpart BRP) even if it is unclear whether he/she would 
suffer any negative consequences for breaking it. 
• Decline the (counterpart BRP's) offer to enter into an unwritten agreement. 
• Suggest that the (counterpart BRP) and I enter into an unwritten agreement. 
 
Surveillance Dimension Items 
• Watch the (counterpart BRP) attentively in order to make sure he/she doesn't do something 
detrimental to the (respondent's organization). 
• Keep surveillance over the (counterpart BRP) (i.e., “look over his/her shoulder”) after asking 
him/her to do something. 
• Feel confident after asking the (counterpart BRP) to do something. 
• Check with other people about the activities of the (counterpart BRP) to make sure he/she is not 
trying to “get away” with something. 
• In situations other than contract negotiations, check records to verify facts stated by the 
(counterpart BRP). 
4.3 Relation between contract and trust 
The relation between contract and trust received a lot of attention from scholars the last decades, 
but the results so far are not yet conclusive. To demonstrate a part of the status quo of this debate, 
I will discuss two recent researches below as a contribution to the development of a theoretical per-
spective for this research. 
4.3.1 Effects of control on trust and cooperation 
Coletti, Sedatole and Towry (2005) challenged prior research, which found that the mere presence 
of a control system causes decision makers to view the collaborative setting as non-cooperative 
and other collaborators as untrustworthy. They conducted two experiments to explore the effects of 
control on trust and cooperation. They found evidence that a control system can actually enhance 
the level of trust among collaborators, provided the control system is strong enough to induce co-
operation and that this cooperation is observed by the collaborators. They also found that this in-
creased trust has a positive effect on the future level of cooperation among collaborators. 
 
Collaborations are vulnerable to failure because they are exposed to both performance risk and re-
lational risk (Das & Teng, 2001). The latter is unique to collaborations. High levels of relational risk 
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arise because of the social dilemma nature of collaborations. Social dilemmas are situations where 
opportunistic behavior leads to suboptimal outcomes but cooperative behavior is not individually ra-
tional. Management accountants can play an important role in mitigating relational risk through the 
design and implementation of formal control mechanisms. Controls mitigate relational risk by 
changing the incentives for opportunistic behavior. Prior empirical research documents the use of 
formal control mechanisms to reduce relational risk in collaborations. Prior research, however, also 
suggests that control systems can have unintended negative effects on trust, which is conceptual-
ized as the perceived likelihood that another person will cooperate, absent any economic incen-
tives to do so. If this claim is correct, then this presents a conundrum to the designers of manager-
ial control systems, who must choose the optimal level of control, considering both the benefits 
(through reduced incentives for opportunistic behavior) and the costs (including a degradation of 
trust, which is assumed to be a critical determinant of collaborative success). 
 
Coletti et al. claim that these prior studies inhibit the positive effects of control systems, because 
they failed to incorporate two common features of control systems: (1) increased cooperation in-
duced by the economic incentives control systems provide, and (2) feedback regarding that coop-
eration (e.g. performance reports). Contrary to these prior research findings, Coletti et al. expect 
the level of trust to increase in control system strength and validated their hypotheses by conduct-
ing two experiments. The first experiment was designed to explore the effect of control on trust, 
while the second experiment also provides evidence on the effect of trust on subsequent coopera-
tion. The process by which Coletti et al. predict control to positively affect trust and cooperation is 
depicted in the diagram below: 
 
 
 
H1a: Participants will judge others to be more trustworthy when there is a control system in place 
(that induces cooperation) than when there is no control system. 
H1b: The effect of a control system on perceived trustworthiness will be mediated by cooperation. 
H2: The level of cooperation will be greater for collaborators with higher perceptions of each 
other’s trustworthiness. 
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Coletti et al. concluded after conducting the experiments that control systems aimed at reducing 
relational risk promote greater cooperation, which is observed by participating collaborators. This 
observed cooperative behavior allows collaborators to build trust in one another, and this trust rein-
forces the positive effects of the control system in eliciting future cooperation. They also note that 
the trust-building benefits of control exhibited in their paper may not be experienced in collaborative 
settings without feedback mechanisms. 
4.3.2 Trust, contract and relationship development 
Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2005) also contributed to the debate on the relation 
between trust and control in the management of inter-organizational relationships. They specifically 
focused on the dynamic interaction between trust and (formal) contract by addressing the following 
questions: (1) Are trust and contract complements or substitutes, or both? (2) Does contract 
precede trust or does it follow it? And (3) how does this affect relationship development and 
performance? 
 
Klein Woolthuis et al. propose that some of the conceptual differences of opinion, and the diverging 
empirical results, are due to different interpretations of the notion of trust. Previous empirical re-
search has failed to uncover how and why contracts and trust substitute for and/or complement 
each other. In order to go beyond conceptual discussions on the interplay between contract and 
trust, they defined the concepts in detail and subsequently designed a longitudinal empirical re-
search that allowed them to look into the process of trust development and the drawing up and use 
of contracts. To perform the research four cases were selected that represent the extremes of low 
versus high trust and low versus high contract completeness. All cases entailed uncertainty and/or 
complexity, and specific investments, and hence risks of dependence, opportunism and ‘hold-up’. 
 
Trust was measured by asking the consultants who guided and monitored the projects their overall 
assessment of the degree of trust. Furthermore, trust was discussed in the interviews with the con-
sultant as a possible explanation of how the relationships had developed. These data were triangu-
lated with secondary data sources leading to an in-depth and balanced insight into the social rela-
tionships between the partners involved. Dependence was measured by evaluating the size of the 
companies, the lock-in due to uniqueness of resources (technological knowledge, capabilities), 
uniqueness of partners (number of alternative partners), and the switching costs due to asset spec-
ificity. Contract completeness was measured by looking at the number of pages, number and type 
of clauses, the type of contract (standard versus custom-made), and the detail in which the clauses 
were worked out. The degree to what parties engaged in monitoring, and had actually used the 
contract to enforce behavior was also investigated. Finally, an assessment of the outcome of the 
project was needed. For this, first, the technological success of the project was measured, second, 
the degree to which the project remained within budget and time schedule, and third, the degree to 
which partners were able to solve problems within the relationship. The following table summarizes 
the cases on these key dimensions. 
 
 Petfood Biowrap Wrapline Pharm Venture 
Degree of trust Low High Low High 
Dependence High, asymmetric High, symmetric Low/moderate, 
symmetric 
High, symmetric 
Contract 
completeness 
High Low Low High 
Outcome Conflict and 
premature end 
Highly successful Conflict and 
premature end 
Highly successful 
 
The Biowrap case illustrates the relationship, much hypothesized by sociologists, that trust can 
successfully substitute contracts. The Petfood case shows that a contract is not always effective in 
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achieving good outcomes. Klein Woolthuis et al. concluded that contracts may be a poor ordering 
mechanism in the case of one-sided dependence, which is precisely the situation where contracts 
are needed most. It illustrates that a contract may not be enforceable because of other than techni-
cal legal reasons (e.g. enforceable clauses, availability of courts). Social considerations (e.g. repu-
tation, the will to keep a friendly relationship) and the shadow of the future (one might need the 
partner again) may make it undesirable to enforce a contract. The Pharm Venture case illustrates 
how trust and contract can complement and mutually reinforce each other. The case illustrates that 
trust may be needed as a precondition for negotiating and drawing up a complex contract. First, to 
prevent distrust: prior trust may provide the basis for openness and psychological safety that is 
needed to negotiate these sensitive issues (e.g. relationship termination or sharing costs in case 
things go wrong) and prevent the triggering of a vicious circle of mutual distrust, defensive behavior 
and conflict. Second, prior trust may be needed for the parties to be willing to invest in the relation-
ship. The Wrapline case, finally, illustrates that the absence of complete contracts cannot always 
be interpreted as a sign of trust. 
 
The cases show that the relation between trust and contract is a complex and dynamic one, and 
that in a trusting atmosphere contracts can have a different function and meaning. Whereas com-
panies that fear opportunism view their contract as a safeguard against opportunism, companies 
that have a trusting relationship tend to interpret contracts as a tangible expression of trust that has 
been built up over the years. More specifically, Klein Woolthuis et al. concluded that trust will in 
general precede contracts. No examples of contract providing a basis for trust were found. Al-
though calculative trust may be based on legal regulation, this will form a poor basis for the inter-
personal care, concern and benevolence that characterizes the deep trust that was investigated in 
this study. Also concluded from this study was that trust and contracts can be both substitutes and 
complements. Whether contracts and trust are substitutes or complements depends on the inten-
tions with which contracts are drawn up and used. First, if a contract is not interpreted as a strict 
legal safeguard, trust and contract may go well hand in hand, in which case trust and contract will 
be complementary. Second, when parties trust each other, they may decide not to include safe-
guarding clauses in their contract, in which case trust substitutes for contract. Third, in situations of 
high distrust, parties may put great emphasis on contracts and detailed safeguarding clauses, in 
which case contract substitutes for trust. Finally, Klein Woolthuis et al. found that relationships 
characterized by trust were more successful. No examples of how a contract can guarantee suc-
cess were found. 
 
From the four cases Klein Woolthuis et al. concluded that, looking at the relationship’s develop-
ment, the exact content of contracts and intentions with which these contracts were drawn up and 
used provides an increased understanding of how trust and contract are related. Key to this under-
standing is that the general conceptualization of contracts as uni-dimensional legal safeguarding 
instruments is wrong. The cases show that contracts may have different functions, which can also 
be social in nature. These functions may be reflected in the content of clauses included in the con-
tract. This study has uncovered three additional functions of contracts: (1) coordination (technical 
aid to managing the relationship), (2) safeguard for contingencies and (3) sign of commitment. 
Contracts will be mixed, but at the same time, be directed towards one or the other function, which 
will be reflected in the clauses included. In this sense, one could claim that contracts may be envis-
aged as the sedimentation of the negotiation and commitment stages that partners go through. In 
this interpretation contracts can, like trust, be seen as both the basis and outcome of cooperation. 
In a trusting atmosphere, negotiating the contract can be seen as a process of getting to know and 
understand each other. Here, trust can serve as a basis for contract. In an opportunistic atmos-
phere, instead, contract negotiations can resemble the battlefield, where the most powerful partner 
dominates contract content and execution. 
 
Klein Woolthuis et al. claim that future research should no longer focus solely on the mere pres-
ence, absence or completeness of contract. Rather, future researchers should look at, first, the 
precise content of clauses included, second, the intentions with which the contract is drawn up, and 
third, the actual use of the contract. In other words, the contract should be placed in its social con-
text and within the relationship’s development. By interpreting contracts in this dynamic social as 
well as legal fashion, the relation between trust and contract becomes less simple, but it also brings 
us closer to reality. 
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5. Research results 
In this chapter the results of the empirical part of my research are presented. Following the phasing 
of a content analysis effort, as described in section 3.3.3, successively the collection, the making 
and the analysis of the research data are described. 
5.1 Data collection 
A large part of the documentation regarding the IT outsourcing contract between the outsourcing 
organization (OOE) and the IT service provider (ISP) that has been investigated, was stored by ISP 
in nine Lotus Notes databases, each of which was archived on a CD. Besides these archived data-
bases I was also granted access to three current Lotus Notes databases regarding the execution of 
the outsourcing contract. In one of the current databases I found yet another archived database 
concerning the period before the first contract was closed. An overview of the contents of these 
thirteen databases is provided in Appendix B. 
 
Note: For reasons of confidentiality the names OOE and ISP are fictitious. 
 
Unfortunately I couldn’t access two of provided archived databases at all. Of the other databases I 
counted the total number of accessible documents (using a view showing all documents) and com-
pared these with the number of documents stored in the database shown in the database proper-
ties. It appeared that in some databases I couldn’t access all documents in the database, most 
likely because these documents are ‘private’ and only accessible to specifically authorized users. I 
discussed this situation with the responsible manager of ISP, but it was decided I couldn’t get 
access to these documents for my research. Because the accessible documents in the ‘Program 
Operations Support Tool (POST) for OOE’ database only seem to contain information about the 
internal organization of ISP, I decided not to include this database in my research. The documents 
in the ‘OOE Transition’ database concern the period after the second contract was closed. Be-
cause this period is not in the scope of my research, I didn’t include this database in my research 
as well. This implies only the following nine of the provided thirteen databases have been investi-
gated: 
 
Database name Size (MB) Total no. of 
Documents 
Accessible 
Documents 
Regular 
Documents 
OOE Workroom 147 224 224 160 
OOE Transition AD/M 27 52 52 42 
OOE Transition Infrastructure 449 713 713 612 
OOE Engagement Teamroom 523 1,670 1,670 1,590 
OOE Engagement Teamroom (2) 169 323 323 159 
OOE Delivery Teamroom 524 1,159 1,159 1,099 
OOE Service Management Infrastructure 274 216 216 206 
OOE NL Teamroom 1,182 1,208 1,087 807 
OOE RALLY Teamroom 185 172 171 114 
Totals 3,333 5,737 5,615 4,789 
 
As shown in the above overview, these databases contain 5,737 Notes documents of which 5,615 
are accessible. Some of the accessible documents contain for example team member profiles or 
category definitions and these documents are not shown in the ‘All documents’ views of the data-
bases. The total number of documents in the ‘All documents’ views of the databases sum up to 
4,789 (regular) documents. The total size of these databases is approximately 3.3 gigabyte. 
5.2 Data making 
As already mentioned in section 3.3.3 the collected data must be prepared for analysis. This data 
making process consists of four steps (unitizing, sampling, coding and reducing) and these steps 
will be described in the following subsections. 
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5.2.1 Unitizing 
According to Krippendorff (2004) units are wholes that content analysts distinguish and treat as in-
dependent elements. Although units are often regarded as a function of the empirical tenacity of 
what is observed, it’s the act of unitizing that creates them and recognizes them as such. In content 
analysis three kinds of units deserve distinction: sampling units, coding (a.k.a. recording) units and 
context units. 
5.2.1.1 SAMPLING UNITS 
Sampling units are units that are distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis. Content ana-
lysts must define sampling units so that connections across sampling units, if they exist, do not bias 
the analysis and all relevant information is contained in individual sampling units or, if it is not, the 
omissions do not impoverish the analysis. 
 
I used (Lotus) Notes documents as sampling units. Of the five ways Krippendorff distinguishes in 
defining units, this can be considered as a physical distinction, but it also has characteristics of syn-
tactical and categorical distinctions, because Notes documents are normally created per topic. Phy-
sical distinctions are suitable for defining sampling units and have the advantage of being efficient 
and reliable. I copied the sampled Notes documents to a separate Notes database to have only 
one database with sampled documents. This made coding and analysis easier. 
5.2.1.2 CODING UNITS 
Coding units are units that are distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording or 
coding. Coding units are typically contained in sampling units. A good reason for choosing coding 
units that are significantly smaller than the sampling units is that sampling units are often too rich or 
too complex to be described reliably. To obtain reliable accounts of larger units of text, content ana-
lysts have found it convenient to describe smaller units on which they can more easily agree and 
then use analytic procedures to obtain descriptions of larger units. 
 
Text fragments in the sampled Notes documents seem the most appropriate way in defining coding 
units in this research. By using this approach I followed the guidance of having coding units that 
are contained in sampling units and syntactical distinctions tend to be efficient and reliable. Section 
5.2.3.2 describes how I recorded and coded the selected text fragments. 
5.2.1.3 CONTEXT UNITS 
Context units are units of textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in the 
description of recording units. Unlike sampling and recording/coding units, context units are not 
counted, need not be independent of each other, can overlap and may be consulted in the descrip-
tion of several recording units. Because of the limited scope of my research, I decided not to use 
context units. 
5.2.2 Sampling 
Because the body of available texts is too large to be examined as a whole, I needed to limit it to a 
more manageable size. Krippendorff (2004) describes several techniques for sampling texts. Be-
cause the available texts are generated for other purposes than being analyzed for this research, 
the different textual units don’t have an equal relevance for my research questions. This implies 
that statistical sampling techniques (probability sampling) are not feasible for my research and that 
the sampling of texts should be a function of what is known about the distribution of information 
(content) within a textual universe. 
 
The available Notes databases (see section 5.1) can be considered as a convenience sample, 
because they don’t contain all information that might be relevant to my research. It’s likely, for 
example, that OOE has documents with regard to the outsourcing contract, that haven’t been made 
available to ISP and are therefore not stored in the Notes databases. Despite that, it’s not feasible 
to examine all documents available from these Notes databases, so I needed additional sampling 
techniques to limit the size even further. In order to accomplish this I only took into account the 
documents that contain information about the relationship with OOE (e.g. contracts, contract exten-
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sions, correspondence, complaints and surveys) and skip the documents related to the internal 
operations of ISP. This technique is known as relevance sampling or purposive sampling. In the 
subsections below I have described per database which documents I have sampled. 
5.2.2.1 OOE WORKROOM 
This database mainly concerns the period before the first contract was closed. One of the first 
documents in this database is the proposal for the outsourcing contract, which was released on 12-
12-2000. I also found several documents concerning the preparation for this proposal (base case 
study and meeting minutes). After the proposal was issued it was agreed by both parties to do a 
‘joint verification’ effort for which a separate contract was closed (professional services agreement). 
This effort was started after a letter of intent had been signed by both parties. Because of some 
strategic discussions between OOE (a European subsidiary of a global company) with its head-
quarters, the start of the joint verification was delayed until July 2001. Most documents in the data-
base are related to this joint verification and to several versions of the outsourcing contract and its 
appendices and schedules. The first contract was signed by OOE on 27-11-2001. 
 
By having a quick glance at all 160 regular documents, I selected 54 documents that seemed to be 
relevant to my research. These documents include the initial proposal, the joint verification 
agreement (several versions), all versions of the outsourcing contract and its appendices and 
schedules and minutes of meetings in which people from both organizations were present. I 
skipped the documents related to the internal operations of ISP and the technical solution. 
5.2.2.2 OOE TRANSITION AD/M 
After the first outsourcing contract was signed, a transition project was started to migrate the “as-is” 
services of OOE to the contracted services of ISP. At ISP two different business units are involved 
in the delivery of the application management and infrastructure services. This database contains 
documents about the transition of the application management (AD/M: application development 
and maintenance) from OOE to ISP. The transition was planned to be completed on 01-06-2002 
and consisted of two consecutive phases: the ‘best effort’ phase and the ‘service level objectives’ 
phase. The SLO phase for AD/M started on 01-03-2002. 
 
This database mainly contains documents created during the best effort phase of the AD/M transi-
tion. The documents are meeting minutes, project plans, progress reports, procedures, etc. Be-
cause most of these documents are related to the internal operations of ISP, I only selected the 
minutes of the weekly overall transition meetings, in which also OOE was involved, to be part of the 
sample (11 documents). 
5.2.2.3 OOE TRANSITION INFRASTRUCTURE 
Like the AD/M transition, the infrastructure transition was also planned to be completed on 01-06-
2002 and consisted of a best effort and a service level objectives phase, although the SLO phase 
for the infrastructure started already on 21-01-2002. Of the more than 600 documents in this data-
base, only about 100 documents were created during the transition period. Most of these docu-
ments are related to the internal operations of ISP (project plans, solution designs, procedures, 
progress reports, etc.). The database also contains minutes of the overall transition meetings, but 
these were already sampled from the OOE Transition AD/M database (see previous section). The 
remaining documents in this database contain information about the delivery of several infrastruc-
ture projects. These projects were not in scope of the original contract, but were requested addi-
tionally by OOE via requests for services (RFS). Documents regarding these requests will be sam-
pled from both engagement databases (see next two sections). The only documents that might 
contain relevant information for my research seem to be the minutes of meetings with regard to 
these projects, so I added these (56) documents to my sample. 
5.2.2.4 OOE ENGAGEMENT TEAMROOM 
To increase revenue and profit ISP tries to sell services to OOE beyond the scope of the original 
outsourcing contract. The results of these efforts during the period June 2002 until January 2004 
are documented in this database. Besides some documents regarding the preparation of these 
efforts (e.g. minutes of internal meetings and account plans) most documents in this database are 
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related to requests for services (147) from OOE, that resulted from these efforts. Although all of 
these documents might contain information relevant to my research, it would not be feasible to ex-
amine all these documents. Therefore I decided to select two requests from the beginning of the 
contract (mid 2002), two requests from the period when the execution of the contract was ‘business 
as usual’ (early 2003) and two request from the period just before the OOE satisfaction crisis docu-
mented in the OOE NL Teamroom (end 2003/early 2004). For each period one of the selected con-
tracts led to an amendment of the original contract, while the other selected request was cancelled 
by OOE. In order to be able to compare the requests, I only took into account requests for which 
the original request form was stored in the database and, in case of the cancelled requests, for 
which the reason of cancellation was explicitly documented in the database. Unfortunately I could 
not find a cancelled request meeting these requirements in the last period, so I added five requests 
(consisting of 49 documents) to my sample. 
5.2.2.5 OOE ENGAGEMENT TEAMROOM (2) 
During the execution of the (first) outsourcing contract OOE apparently changed its official name. It 
seems that ISP, in response to this name change, decided to setup a new database for engage-
ment related documents. It’s not clear why this database was only used for a short period of time 
(about 7 months), but because I also found documents related to engagement in the OOE NL 
Teamroom, I suppose it was decided that it would be more convenient to have all documents rela-
ted to the outsourcing contract in one database. Because most of the documents in this database 
are related to requests for services, which are also documented in the OOE Engagement Team-
room, I decided not to sample any document from this database. 
5.2.2.6 OOE SERVICE MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
In this database documents are stored regarding the delivery of infrastructure services to OOE. I 
had a quick glance at the documents in this database and it seemed most of these documents are 
strictly related to the internal operations of ISP. The documents that might contain information 
about the relationship with OOE (e.g. documents with communication type ‘D04 – Contract Docu-
mentation’) have already been sampled from other databases. I therefore decided not to add any 
document from this database to my sample. 
5.2.2.7 OOE DELIVERY TEAMROOM 
This database contains a very large number of documents related to the management of the deli-
very of infrastructure and application management services to OOE. In order to make it feasible to 
select relevant documents, I decided to focus on some specific communication types, which most 
likely contain information about the relationship with OOE: 
 
• Claims and Complaints 
• Contract Changes 
• Correspondence to Customer 
• Customer Satisfaction 
• Disputes 
• Issues 
• Meetings with Customer 
 
Because it wouldn’t be feasible to analyze all 179 documents with communication type ‘Corres-
pondence to Customer’ I only added the first ten (25-10-2001 to 04-12-2001) and the last ten (10-
06-2003 to 09-09-2003) documents with this communication type to my sample. From the other 
communication types I added all documents (60) to my sample. 
5.2.2.8 OOE NL TEAMROOM 
Although the first document in this database was created on 22-01-2002, it contains only 11 docu-
ments created before 27-11-2003, so it’s likely that this database is a common successor of sever-
al previously mentioned databases. Because I’m only interested in documents created up to the 
signing of the renewed contract on 17-05-2005, I didn’t take into account the documents created 
after 31-05-2005, which leaves 682 regular documents to consider for my sample. Of these docu-
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ments 522 are categorized in one of the RFS (request for services) related categories (‘2A. Pre-
RFS Fase’, ‘2B. Engagement Fase’, ‘2. RFS’ and ‘RFS’). Browsing quickly through these docu-
ments I couldn’t find a request for service for which both the original request form and the final 
result were stored in the database in order to compare this request to the requests selected from 
the OOE Engagement database. I therefore decided not to add any of these documents to my 
sample. Of the remaining documents it’s most likely that the documents labelled with the following 
categories contain information about the relationship with OOE: 
 
• 4. Meetings/Customer 
• 5. Account Management 
• 6. Contract Management 
• Client Satisfaction 
• Contract Management 
• Customer Correspondence 
• Signings 
 
I added these documents to my sample, except for the documents in the contract management and 
signings categories, because I already sampled the same kind of documents from other databases. 
 
Note: In this database I also found two archives of the ‘OOE Business Office’ mail database. Un-
fortunately I was not able to open the archive containing the mails from 2004 (and maybe 
even before) due to access restrictions. The other archive contains mails from 2005. Be-
cause I couldn’t get access to one of the archives and because I think I already sampled 
quite a lot of information from the other databases, I decided not to incorporate these mail 
archives into my research. 
5.2.2.9 OOE RALLY TEAMROOM 
This database is dedicated to the preparation of the renewed contract in 2005 (codename RALLY). 
Of the documents contained in this database, I expected to find information about the relationship 
with OOE in the following categories: 
 
• Contracts in progress 
• Contracts old 
• Meeting minutes 
• Presentation extern 
 
I decided to add all documents in these categories (26) to my sample. 
5.2.3 Coding 
In order to be able to analyze the sampled texts, the unstructured data must be coded into the 
terms of a data language. In the following subsections the data language and the approach 
according to which the sampled text have been coded are described. 
5.2.3.1 DATA LANGUAGE 
A data language mediates between the experience of reading text on the one hand and the formal 
demands made by available analytical procedures on the other. Common to all data languages are 
the variables and the possible values within these variables (dimensions). In order to avoid making 
the analysis of the coded texts too complex to be done manually, I used simple, binary variables 
derived from the theoretical perspective in the previous chapter. This implies I only coded text 
fragments from the sampled documents in which one or more characteristics, as defined by the 
variables, are present. The variables are listed below. 
 
Contract design 
 
Although Transaction Cost Economics and derivatives provide relevant background information to 
my research (see section 4.1.1), these theories mainly focus on why alliances exist. Because this 
doesn’t contribute directly in answering my research question, I didn’t use possible variables from 
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these theories during the coding effort and only used these theories during the analysis phase. The 
factors which according to Anderson and Dekker (2005) determine the contract design (see section 
4.1.2) seem to be relevant in answering my research question, so I decided to define a variable for 
each of these factors: 
 
1. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty reflects the difficulty of defining ex ante and verifying ex post the products and 
services for which the parties are contracting. In general, uncertainty can arise from many 
sources, like market dynamics, disturbances in the external environment, environmental 
complexity, task uncertainty and complexity, and unfamiliarity. 
 
2. Complexity 
Complexity denotes situations where both parties to a transaction contribute complex compo-
nents or services that interact in unpredictable ways to produce the desired final product or 
service. 
 
3. Asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to exposure of the transacting parties to ex post opportunistic holdup 
that is caused by significant investments in human or physical assets that have little or no 
value outside of the transaction. 
 
4. Information impactedness 
A situation of information impactedness exists when information relevant to the transaction is 
known to one party in the transaction, but cannot costlessly be obtained by the other party, 
e.g. when the latter party is not able to observe and to assess perceptively the true quality of 
actually delivered contributions of the first party. 
 
5. Competition 
The intensity of competition in the supplier’s product market at the time that the transaction 
was initiated is a force that reduces transaction hazards. 
 
6. Power 
The ex ante bilateral power differential between the buyer and supplier is denoted by the de-
pendency of the buyer on the supplier before the transaction. 
 
Evolution of trust 
 
Looking at the four researches discussed in section 4.2 a distinction can be made between 
interpersonal and interorganizational trust on the one hand and between affect-based and 
cognition-based trust on the other hand. Based on these distinctions I defined the following four 
variables: 
 
7. Personal affection 
A situation where managers and professionals working for the different parties in the alliance 
freely share their ideas, feelings, hopes and problems and are confident the other person will 
listen and will respond constructively and caringly. 
 
8. Personal competence 
This applies to situations where a person working for one party in the alliance is confident 
about the competence, professionalism and dedication of a person working for the other party 
in the alliance. 
 
9. Organizational trustworthiness 
This denotes a situation where persons working for one party in the alliance believe that the 
other party won’t take (excessive) advantage of them even when the opportunity is available. 
They won’t hesitate to transact with the other party even when the specifications are vague 
and they are confident the other party will keep the promises made to them. 
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10. Organizational competence 
The persons working for one party in the alliance think the other party in the alliance is compe-
tent when they believe the other party make good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with 
any commitments both explicit (formal contracts) or implicit (informal contracts). 
 
Relation between trust and contract 
 
The researches referenced in section 4.3 that investigated the relation between trust and contract, 
take a quite holistic approach to the problem. Therefore I didn’t try to derive variables from these 
researches to be used in coding individual documents. I only used these researches when 
interpreting and analyzing the results from the coding phase (see section 5.3). 
 
Additional variables 
 
As described in the next section, I created an inventory of all the sampled documents by having a 
quick glance at all these documents before I started the actual coding. As a result of this effort I 
decided to define a few additional variables: 
 
11. Price/Performance 
This variable is closely related to the ‘organizational competence’ variable, but explicitly de-
fines a link between the competence/performance of the IT service provider and the price the 
customer is paying for the services. Although the customer can trust the competence of the 
service provider, when the customer thinks he is paying too much for the services, he might 
think the service provider is abusing his position. In this sense this variable is also related to 
the variables ‘asset specificity’, ‘power’ and ‘organizational trustworthiness’. 
 
12. Bureaucracy 
I added this variable, because I found a document in my sample (2004) in which the bureau-
cracy of ISP was explicitly identified by OOE as one of the causes of their troubled relation-
ship. Although rules and procedures can improve the professionalism of the IT service provid-
er (organizational competence), these same rules and procedures can also be interpreted by 
the customer as a sign of distrust. 
 
13. Risk mitigation 
Outsourcing of IT services involves a large investment of the IT service provider in staff and 
infrastructure. To safeguard this investment the IT service provider will try to mitigate the risk 
that the customer will obtain new services from another provider. This can be considered as a 
symptom of asset specificity, so I mainly added this variable for my convenience. 
5.2.3.2 CODING APPROACH 
The sampling effort described in section 5.2.2 initially resulted in a new Lotus Notes database con-
taining 294 selected documents with a total size of approximately 300 MB. In order to get a general 
overview of the contents of the sampled documents, I opened all these documents to have a quick 
glance at its contents. In a spreadsheet I created a row for each document, while recording the 
creation date and the subject (for traceability to the original document), the topic date (derived from 
the contents) and a short description of the contents. I ordered the documents on topic date to 
have a chronological overview. 
 
While making this inventory, it soon became clear to me that the sample I created still contained 
thousands of pages of text and I realized that it would take several full-time months to scrutinously 
code all these texts. Even global reading of these texts in order to find meaningful text fragments 
would probably take multiple weeks, which wouldn’t be feasible regarding the time constraints of 
my research project. Therefore I decided to focus at the documents that, based on the quick glance 
I had at their contents, have the highest potential in contributing to answer my research questions. 
More specifically I took the following approach: 
 
1. Contract differences 
Because I want to find an answer to the question how the evolution of (dis)trust between part-
ners in an alliance influences the contents of a renewed contract, I started to compare the 
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contents of the old and the new contract (both the main body and the schedules and exhibits) 
using the ‘Compare and Merge Documents’ tool of Microsoft Word. By making this comparison 
I discovered that the main body of the contract and several schedules hardly hadn’t been 
changed at all (only ‘cosmetic’ changes and changes that can be attributed to the different 
status quo at the times both contracts were written), while other schedules had been com-
pletely rewritten. In order to explain these differences, I searched my sample database for 
documents with additional information about the solution design of the new contract. Although 
I found a document in my sample database, this didn’t provide me with enough information to 
be able to explain the differences. I therefore searched in the ‘OOE RALLY Teamroom’ to find 
additional documentation. I found 3 documents that seemed to contain the information I was 
looking for and I added these 3 documents to my sample database. 
 
2. Pre contract phase 
Of all the documents in my sample database from the period before signing the first out-
sourcing contract (27-11-2001), 58 in total, I skipped the ones containing versions of the 
(schedules of the) outsourcing contract, because I decided to focus on the differences be-
tween the 2 contracts only (see previous point). I also skipped some documents that didn’t 
contain much (additional) information. Of the remaining documents (28) I coded the contents. 
In some of these documents (8) however, I didn’t find any text fragments about the relation-
ship between ISP and OOE. 
 
3. Contract amendments 
In section 5.2.2.4 I described how I sampled 49 documents related to requests for services 
(RFS). Reading the contents of these documents I found that these documents only contain 
technical and operational information. Because these requests for services played an impor-
tant role during the execution of the first contract, I decided to follow a different approach. I 
created a new spreadsheet with an overview of all requests for services (based on an already 
existing, but incomplete overview). In total I found 172 of these request for services (147 from 
the ‘OOE Engagement Teamroom’ and 25 from the ‘OOE NL Teamroom’). Of these 172 re-
quests, 54 led to a proposed amendment of the outsourcing contract, while the other requests 
resulted in proposed statements of work or were cancelled before a proposal was created. 
Because my main interest is in the outsourcing contracts, I focused on the 54 contract amend-
ments. Of these amendments I recorded in the spreadsheet the total annual service charge 
and the one time charge. I also recorded the (estimated) date on which the RFS was sub-
mitted and the (estimated) date on which the RFS was signed (44), lost (1), rejected (6) or put 
on hold (3). 
 
4. Other documents 
Of the documents in my sample database not related to the contracts and request for services, 
I decided to skip the documents related to specific projects performed under the umbrella of 
the outsourcing contract, because I expected these documents to contain only technical and 
operational information. I also skipped some documents which seemed to be duplicates of 
other documents or which hardly contained any information. I coded the remaining documents 
(79), but in quite a lot of these documents (58) I didn’t find any information related to any of the 
identified variables. 
 
The 107 documents I selected for coding still contain hundreds of pages of text. The most effective 
way to code these texts within a feasible amount of time seemed to globally read the texts, search-
ing for text fragments related to any of the identified variables. In the spreadsheet containing the 
overview of all documents in my sample, I added a column for every variable. Whenever I found a 
text fragment that could be related to a variable, I added this text fragment in the cross-section 
(cell) of the row for the document and the column for the variable. I realize this approach is not very 
reliable and it’s likely that I overlooked text fragments that might have been relevant in finding an-
swers to my research question. The approach was however effective, because I was able to find 
many relevant text fragments within a reasonable amount of time. 
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5.2.4 Reducing 
As already mentioned in the previous section, I didn’t find any relevant text fragments in 66 of the 
107 selected documents. In the remaining 41 documents I found a total of 208 text fragments. 
These fragments were attributed to the variables as follows: 
 
Variable # of fragments 
Uncertainty 5 
Complexity 2 
Asset specificity 16 
Information impactedness 11 
Competition 4 
Power 1 
Personal affection 3 
Personal competence 3 
Organizational trustworthiness 33 
Organizational competence 43 
Price/Performance 47 
Bureaucracy 18 
Risk mitigation 22 
Total 208 
  
Because I think it’s still comprehensible to consider all these text fragments individually, I decided 
not to search for (statistical) techniques to reduce this information. I also took this decision, be-
cause I expected the number of fragments is too low to yield plausible results after applying statis-
tical reduction techniques. 
5.3 Data analysis 
This section starts with an overview of the historical events regarding both outsourcing contracts, 
based on the information I found in the documents in my sample database. Subsequently, these 
events are reflected upon using the theoretical perspective described in chapter 4. 
5.3.1 Historical overview 
Looking backward at the development of the relationship between the IT service provider (ISP) and 
the outsourcing organization (OOE) with regard to both outsourcing contracts several phases can 
be recognized: 
5.3.1.1 FIRST CONTRACT NEGOTIATION 
OOE is the European branch of a global company, which has its main office near Amsterdam and 
with several offices elsewhere in the Netherlands and throughout Europe. OOE is operating in a 
dynamic and highly competitive market in which it's increasingly difficult to align the IT services to 
the business requirements at acceptable costs. To cope with this situation OOE started discussions 
with one of its IT suppliers to explore the options to fully outsource all IT operations to this compa-
ny. These discussions resulted in an outsourcing proposal for seven years from ISP, released at 
12-12-2000. In this proposal ISP presents itself as a trustworthy and competent partner, that has 
an outstanding track record in this business, will take ultimate care of OOE’s employees that will 
move to ISP and will always act in the best interest of customer. The main benefit for OOE seems 
to be the prospect of lower IT costs (especially in the application development and maintenance 
area). ISP will accomplish this by using their economies of scale and a more professional/mature IT 
organization. This latter aspect is implemented by several (bureaucratic) processes (Capability 
Maturity Model) and ISP requires OOE to implement such processes (demand management) as 
well. After the presentation of this proposal, OOE is asking many questions about the actual 
contents of the proposal. Quite a few of these questions show some doubt whether ISP is able to 
meet the agreed service levels (at lower costs) and has the intention to always act at the best 
interest of OOE, as shown, for example, in the following fragment: 
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“It seems that in your proposal you overrate the maintenance/support and clearly understaff 
the enhancements/projects (by factor 3!!!) Can you explain how this will work maintaining the 
same output as the current group?” 
 
In response to these questions ISP reassured OOE to have confidence in its capabilities and inten-
tions. 
 
As a next step in the negotiation process, ISP proposed an agreement to perform a joint verification 
of the scope of the outsourcing contract. The verification effort will only be started however after 
OOE signs a letter of intent (LOI) that it will only negotiate with ISP about the outsourcing of IT 
services. The proposed agreement is a ‘time and material’ contract, which implies OOE has to pay 
for the verification effort by ISP and the risk of not meeting goals and/or budget is also at OOE. 
Because of discussions between OOE and its global headquarters about the strategic IT direction, 
the signing of the letter of intent was postponed. OOE also involved Gartner to perform a ‘sourcing 
readiness assessment’. Gartner found that ISP was actually leading the negotiations, because of a 
lack of experience within the OOE organization. ISP's proposal is therefore more based on their 
capabilities to improve the current situation, than on OOE's (business) needs and requirements. 
The parties already had a good relationship and OOE didn't have much choice besides continuing 
with this provider, but OOE feels ISP is pushing too hard and feels uncomfortable about this. This 
is shown in some of the findings regarding the relationship between OOE and ISP and the 
governance in Gartner’s final presentation1: 
 
“Relationship 
• OOE does not feel confident to sign LOI, ISP feels deal is slipping  
• ISP is pushing the deal; OOE feels pressure 
• Gartner found differences in expectation between ISP and OOE 
 
Governance 
• Not all the joint OOE and ISP governance principles have been sufficiently addressed” 
  
Despite this, the letter of intent and the joint verification agreement were signed at the end of June 
2001, after which the joint verification started. 
 
The joint verification, which was done in a cooperative atmosphere, resulted in a report by ISP with 
several findings per competency and proposed solutions for some of the identified problems. Of the 
main issues mentioned in this report, most mention that previous figures in the proposal have been 
underestimated. Although these extra costs have been estimated by ISP at 7,9M€, the total con-
tract value in the proposal is only raised by 4,9M€ (from 81,7M€ to 86,6M€). Because OOE didn’t 
want to pay this price, alternative scenarios were discussed and especially in the application devel-
opment and maintenance area the ambition levels were considerably cut down. The negotiations 
finally resulted in seven-year outsourcing contract with a total contract value of 72,7M€, which was 
signed at 27-11-2001. Although the main body of the contract covers only 39 pages, the appen-
dices, which describe in great detail the rights and obligations of both parties, cover 323 pages. I 
also noticed that although the actual costs were projected to decrease during the length of the 
contract, the annual services charges paid by OOE are every year the same. This ‘smoothing’ 
hasn’t been done in a separate financing contract, but as integral part of the outsourcing contract. 
5.3.1.2 TRANSITION 
After signing the contract, a half-year transition period started during which IT staff and operations 
were transferred from OOE to ISP. Because within ISP’s organization separate delivery units are 
involved for infrastructure and application development and maintenance (AD/M) activities, this 
distinction was also made in the planning of the transition period as depicted in the diagram below: 
 
                                                     
1
 The real names of the organizations in this and other quotations have been replaced by their fictitious ones. 
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Both delivery units started with a best effort phase in which they managed the IT services to OOE 
with the objective to continue the current level of services, based on and subject to the availability 
of required resources. After the best effort phase, the service level objective (SLO) phase started 
during which the performance of the IT services was measured against objectives and reported to 
OOE. In practice, service level objectives are similar to service level agreements (SLA) with the 
difference that SLA’s are also committed by ISP. During the SLO phase the first requests for ser-
vices were already submitted by OOE and the first contract amendment was signed. 
 
The documents selected from my sample database for coding were all minutes of several types of 
periodical meetings. From these meeting minutes it seems that the transition activities were per-
formed as planned. The move of the mainframe operations from OOE to ISP even went smoother 
than OOE had expected. In an April 2002 executives meeting however, an IT manager of OOE (R.) 
made mention of internal worries about the ability of ISP to handle the transition: 
 
“Mr. U. expressed his dissatisfaction of ISP’s performance on the Transition’ discussed. R. 
confirms OOE internal discussion worrying about ISP ability to handle the transition. Although 
in progress reports lots of green is reported. OOE expects to see some red on actions/deliver-
ables. On user satisfaction two or three incidents are showing ISP is handling with another cul-
ture. Maybe the difference is that OOE is focusing on user satisfaction and thus quick resolu-
tion. ISP is focusing on procedures and structural resolutions.” 
5.3.1.3 BUSINESS AS USUAL (BAU) 
The ‘business as usual’ phase covers the period between the end of the transition phase (01-07-
2002) and the date the new contract was signed (17-05-2005). During this period ISP worked ac-
cording to the service levels agreed in the outsourcing contract and reported about the perform-
ance to OOE. Besides these normal operations more than 170 requests for services from OOE 
were recorded, as already mentioned in section 5.2.3.2. These requests resulted in 44 signed 
contract amendments. Although some of these amendments limited the scope of the services, 
most of the amendments were extensions of the scope. The total contract value of all these signed 
amendments amounts approximately 7,3M€ (ignoring economic cost adjustments). Also a lot of 
additional work has been done by ISP on project basis. Because the information about these con-
tracts (statements of work) didn’t seem to be complete, I decided not to calculate the total value of 
these contracts. 
 
The documents selected from my sample database for coding mainly consist of meeting minutes, 
disputes, customer satisfaction reviews and action plans. From these documents it’s obvious that 
OOE was very dissatisfied with ISP’s performance. It seems this dissatisfaction is mainly related to 
ISP’s managerial competence and OOE is still satisfied about ISP’s technical competence (except 
for the helpdesk). This can be demonstrated by a quote from a customer satisfaction survey per-
formed in July 2003: 
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“Performance is poor. Price /quality ratio is extremely poor. Apart from mainframe operations 
there is no indication that after taking over ISP hat taken any actions visible to improve serv-
ices or lower the costs structure. (…) The reactive attitude is dominated by excuses to do 
nothing, where individual ISP employees hide behind formal procedures instead of being 
proactive in attitude helping to solve the OOE problems.” 
 
During this period ISP appointed two times a new project executive for the outsourcing contract. 
Both started with making an inventory of the problems and made action plans to deal with these 
problems. The actions were mainly aimed at improving the execution of the service delivery. Al-
though OOE appreciated the efforts of the new project executives, they were not able to turn the 
tide. 
5.3.1.4 NEW CONTRACT NEGOTIATION 
Early 2005 OOE and ISP apparently decided to break open the current outsourcing contract and 
started negotiations for a renewed contract. The main objective of OOE for the new contract was to 
reduce the total annual service charges by 2M€ - 4M€ per year. ISP’s objective was to strengthen 
its relationship with OOE and make OOE a reference customer. Based on OOE’s main objective 
ISP investigated all its service areas for possibilities to reduce the costs and then proposed these 
options to OOE. Most of the proposed options were related to reducing the head count (e.g. by 
using more sophisticated tools and decreasing baselines) and moving service delivery activities to 
offshore locations (e.g. transferring the helpdesk to South Africa). 
 
Based on these alternatives ISP drafted a new version of the contract. As I already mentioned in 
section 5.2.3.2 only a few changes were made in the main body and several appendices, where 
other appendices were completely rewritten. It’s likely that the rewritten appendices were a result 
from consolidating the old contract and all its amendments and that these appendices include the 
agreed cost reductions. Remarkable about this renewed contract is that the appendix that de-
scribes the charges now contains an exhibit about gain sharing. Gain sharing is intended to pro-
pose improvements to the services and for both parties to benefit financially from the results of 
such improvements. It’s also noticeable that the (transition) costs to implement the proposed 
solutions to reduce the costs are paid by OOE. The new contract was eventually signed at 17-05-
2005. 
5.3.1.5 NEW CONTRACT EXECUTION 
Although the period after signing the renewed contract wasn’t part of my research, I had a docu-
ment in my sample database that contains the results of a customer satisfaction review of Decem-
ber 2005. In these results several respondents from OOE stated that ISP’s performance was more 
than adequate this year and they expected further improvements in the coming years, for exam-
ple2: 
 
“Mr. v. D. thought that the partnership management this year was much better than before, 
there was more attention and more ‘drive’. He mentioned the RALLY project that OOE and 
ISP executed together, which contributed tremendously to the good relationship. The most 
important result was a new setup of the services, which resulted in a substantial cost reduc-
tion.” 
5.3.2 Theoretical reflection 
In this section the events described above will be reflected upon from the theoretical perspective 
presented in chapter 4. 
5.3.2.1 CONTRACT DESIGN 
Before discussing the design of the outsourcing contract, the question needs to be answered 
whether or not an alliance is an appropriate governance structure for managing IT operations. To 
answer this question from a Transaction Cost Economics point of view the following dimensions 
                                                     
2
 For convenience this text fragment has been translated from Dutch to English. 
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are relevant: (1) the degree of asset specificity of the transaction; (2) its uncertainty (including 
complexity); and (3) its frequency. From the results of the coding effort it can be learned that the 
asset specificity is considerable. The IT service provider needs to invest both in IT staff and in 
hardware, software and third party contracts specifically for this outsourcing contract. These invest-
ments however aren’t completely useless at the (premature) end of the contract: the IT staff can be 
assigned to other operations of the IT service provider and also the hardware, software and third 
party contracts might be used for other purposes. Therefore the level of asset specificity can be 
considered as intermediate. Although I did find some text fragments related to uncertainty and 
complexity during the coding process, most of these fragments are related to the uncertainty and 
complexity of the market in which the customer is operating. I didn’t find much information about 
the uncertainty and complexity of the IT operations, besides that OOE has difficulties in aligning its 
IT strategy and operations to the business strategy. In general, the total IT landscape of an 
organization, consisting of infrastructure, standard software and custom applications, can be very 
complex, because of all interdependencies. The results of efforts related to this IT landscape are 
however not completely unpredictable for people with an appropriate level of IT knowledge and 
skills. Also the level of uncertainty can therefore be considered as intermediate. The frequency of 
the transactions, the final TCE dimension, is very high, because an organization needs its IT 
services every day. According to TCE, the intermediate level of asset specificity makes a hybrid 
governance structure, like an outsourcing contract, appropriate. The intermediate level of uncer-
tainty and high frequency of the transactions however require a very detailed contract and close 
monitoring of the efforts and results of the IT service provider in order to prevent opportunistic 
behavior. Although the outsourcing contracts in this case are very detailed, it seems the clauses in 
the contract are mainly in favor of the IT service provider that wants to protect its investments. 
During the negotiations, primarily led by ISP, the customer apparently didn’t have the experience, 
the culture and (bargaining) power to make sure the outsourcing contracts are protecting OOE’s 
interests as well. This was also noticed by Gartner in June 2001 considering the recommendation: 
 
“ISP and OOE can go forward in signing the Letter of Intent once all prerequisites (stated in 
this document) have been met. Before signing LOI following risks have to be jointly mitigated 
(two to four weeks): 
• OOE needs to take the lead in terms of its requirements to ISP 
• The ISP proposal needs to reflect ISP’s commitment in terms of OOE’s requirements 
(details next slide) 
• OOE needs to improve the project team and planning (details next slide) and bring quality 
assurance in place to monitor the sourcing project  
• OOE and ISP should confirm the basic principles on how the services will be delivered and 
improved (with specific attention to Application Development and Maintenance) 
• OOE and ISP should agree on the principles for a measurement system covering the 
performance of the relationship including current baseline and price (details next slide).” 
 
I also tried to determine which of Speklé’s control archetypes would be most appropriate in this 
case. Considering ex ante programmability of contributions as a synonym for uncertainty in TCE, 
this wasn’t trivial however, because Speklé doesn’t take a moderate level of ex ante programma-
bility into account. The ex ante programmability might be considered high in Speklé’s model, when 
the customer has knowledgeable and skilled IT staff available to assess the actions and outcomes 
of the IT service provider. Combining this with a moderate level of idiosyncrasy (asset specificity) 
the most appropriate control archetype would be arm’s length control. In the hybrid form this would 
imply a detailed and reasonably complete contract. As already mentioned in the previous section, 
in this case the contract is detailed, but mainly in favor of the IT service provider. 
 
Of the six transaction (partner) characteristics mentioned in section 4.1.2 that, according to Ander-
son and Dekker (2005), influence contract design, the characteristics uncertainty, asset specificity 
and (task) complexity were already discussed before. Of the other characteristics, it’s safe to con-
clude that the transaction size is very large. Although there are many IT service providers in the 
Netherlands, only three of these, according to Gartner, were capable of providing the full scope of 
services required by OOE throughout Europe. This implies that the intensity of competition is rather 
low. The ex ante bilateral power differential between OOE and ISP, finally, seems to be small in the 
period before ISP presented the outsourcing proposal to OOE, because ISP was only one of sever-
al suppliers on which OOE didn’t have a large dependency. In the period between the presentation 
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of the proposal and the signing of the contract, however, the dependency of OOE on ISP was 
growing. During the contract negotiations ISP took the lead and OOE didn’t have other feasible al-
ternatives, because the intensity of competition was low and OOE signed a letter of intent to nego-
tiate only with ISP. Considering these transaction (partner) characteristics it can be concluded that 
all these characteristics contribute positively to the extensiveness and the structure of the contract 
according to the model presented by Anderson and Dekker. Although I didn’t study the contents of 
the contracts in detail and also didn’t assess whether and to what extent the 24 components iden-
tified by Anderson and Dekker were present in the contracts, a superficial evaluation of the con-
tracts learned that the contracts are extensive and have quite an elaborated structure. 
5.3.2.2 EVOLUTION OF TRUST 
With regard to measuring the evolution of trust of (employees of) OOE in (employees of) ISP I used 
six variables during my coding effort. Two of these variables are related to interpersonal trust (per-
sonal affection and personal competence) and the other four variables are related to interorganiza-
tional trust (organizational trustworthiness, organizational competence, price/performance and 
bureaucracy). I didn’t collect much evidence regarding the development of interpersonal trust, so it 
can’t be concluded that the evolution of interpersonal trust played a significant role in the develop-
ment of the relationship between OOE and ISP. On the other hand however, almost 70% of the text 
fragments I collected are related to interorganizational trust, so in the paragraphs below I will focus 
on the evolution of interorganizational trust. 
 
When OOE started investigating the option to outsource its IT operations, it had to find an IT serv-
ice provider, which has a pan European coverage, is familiar with the used hardware and software 
and in the future also can handle the maintenance of application systems, especially ERP-pack-
ages. Because OOE didn’t want to spend much money on a long selection process, it was decided 
to create a list of possible IT service providers and to keep on defining knockout criteria until the 
most suitable vendor would remain. As a result, OOE started the negotiations with ISP, because 
this company best applied to the criteria as mentioned previously. The choice of ISP was also sup-
ported by the good relationship OOE already had with ISP and also by the good name ISP had as 
an employer. Consedering this selection process, I conclude that OOE at least had trust in the 
competence of ISP as an outsourcing partner when the discussions about an outsourcing contract 
started. In the original proposal for the outsourcing contract, ISP is emphasizing its capabilities in 
providing the required IT services to OOE and holds out the prospect to OOE of high quality, end-
to-end services at predictable and reduced IT costs over time. Especially in the application devel-
opment and maintenance (AD/M) area ISP thinks it can establish a vast cost reduction by improv-
ing the productivity. ISP also points OOE to its well-established processes and methodologies to 
manage outsourcing contracts, which resulted from extensive outsourcing experience worldwide 
and in the Netherlands. In its advice to OOE, Gartner also recognizes the technical and organiza-
tional capabilities of ISP. Besides emphasizing its competence, ISP also tries to convince OOE of 
its trustworthiness by mentioning several times in the proposal and other documents that it will 
work closely together with OOE towards achieving common objectives. Despite these attempts and 
the good cooperation during the joint verification effort, I found several text fragments indicating 
that OOE is not sure that ISP will always act at the best interest of OOE and won’t behave oppor-
tunistically (see also section 5.3.1.1). I couldn’t find any evidence that OOE changed its ideas 
about the trustworthiness of ISP before signing the contract. Therefore it seems that OOE’s 
decision to sign the outsourcing contract was mainly based on its trust in ISP’s competence and in 
its belief that it was probably cheaper to outsource the IT operations than to continue to manage 
these operations itself (as presented by ISP). The decision for OOE to sign the contract was proba-
bly made easier, because ISP was prepared to lower the annual service charges by reducing the 
scope of the services, which made the contract more attractive to OOE from a cost perspective. 
 
As already mentioned in section 5.3.1.2, quite soon after signing the contract an IT manager of 
OOE gave notice of internal worries about the ability of ISP to handle the transition (April 2002). 
This manager suspects these worries are caused by the different culture within ISP’s organization. 
The former IT department of OOE was used to focus on user satisfaction and quick resolution, 
where ISP is focusing more on procedures and structural resolutions. Afterwards these differences 
in what OOE expects from ISP and how ISP is operating keep reoccurring in the text fragments I 
found. Although OOE seems satisfied about the technical knowledge and skills of ISP, there are 
many complaints from OOE about the responsiveness of ISP to especially small questions and 
Research results 35
 
 Trust-Contract dynamics in IT outsourcing: a case study Date: 21-06-2008  
Version: 1.0 (Final) 
 
requests. This is shown, for example, in the handling of request for services (RFS). Because the 
services are meticulously described in the outsourcing contract, OOE needs to issue a RFS for 
every service, also small ones, that is not covered by the outsourcing contract. For application 
development and maintenance a yearly budget was agreed to handle small requests, but for infra-
structure apparently such a budget didn’t exist. Because within ISP every RFS is handled as a new 
contract, ISP needs a disproportionate amount of time to respond to small requests for services. 
The collected text fragments also show that OOE is dissatisfied about the ‘partnering’ of ISP. In the 
proposal phase for the outsourcing contract ISP emphasized its capabilities in providing high qual-
ity, end-to-end services at predictable and reduced IT costs over time and held out the prospect 
that it would work closely together with OOE towards achieving common objectives. During the 
execution of the contract, OOE experiences that ISP is not really acting as a (pro-active) partner, 
but as a (reactive) supplier (see also section 5.3.1.3). OOE also mentions that ISP is (too) expen-
sive for performing new projects. In response to OOE’s complaints ISP does several attempts to 
change the situation, e.g. by appointing new project executives, who started action programs to 
improve communication and execution. Although OOE recognizes these attempts and is positive 
about the intentions of ISP, OOE’s dissatisfaction with regard to ISP is not really resolved. This is, 
for example, demonstrated in the minutes of an executives meeting in March 20043: 
 
“Early March it was agreed that during the first month after the appointment of the new project 
executive the following issues would have been solved: 
 
1. Helpdesk performs according to agreed parameters. 
2. Running projects will be completed, except OMS. 
3. RFS arrears are made up. 
 
The current results are: 
 
1. Helpdesk is still underperforming. Contractually agreed service levels still aren’t met and 
last week the situation deteriorated. 
2. Remainders of projects are settled. 
3. RFS arrears are made up with regard to smaller cases (SOW). For amendments almost no 
progress has been accomplished. 
 
OOE indicated to be disappointed.”  
 
Despite the good intentions of the ISP employees involved in the outsourcing relationship, ISP as 
an organization seems to lack the flexibility to meet OOE’s expectations. From these observations I 
conclude that the level of trust OOE has in ISP’s competence (especially with regard to gover-
nance) was rather low during almost the whole execution period of the first outsourcing contract. 
Because of this distrust and the poor price/performance ratio OOE is experiencing, it’s likely that 
OOE was quite negative about ISP’s trustworthiness during this first outsourcing contract period as 
well. 
 
In the documents I studied, I found the following causes that explain the downward spiral of trust of 
OOE in ISP: 
 
1. First, it’s obvious that the difference in the organization culture of OOE and ISP played a 
paramount role. It seems OOE has an informal organization culture in which one is used to deal 
with problems on an ad hoc basis. ISP, on the other hand, is a bureaucratic organization that 
has defined procedures for almost every activity. When a problem occurs, one does not only try 
to solve the problem, but also procedures are created or extended to avoid that this problem 
reoccurs in the future. This difference in culture and its implications for the relationship were 
underestimated by both parties in the period before signing the first contract. Such a cultural 
difference isn’t necessarily an impediment for a successful cooperation, but it needs to be 
carefully managed and it takes time to get used to each other. 
 
                                                     
3
 For convenience this text fragment has been translated from Dutch to English. 
Research results 36
 
 Trust-Contract dynamics in IT outsourcing: a case study Date: 21-06-2008  
Version: 1.0 (Final) 
 
2. Managing these (cultural) differences has financial implications though and this leads to another 
important factor in explaining the troubled relationship between OOE and ISP, which is the price 
OOE was willing to pay for the services provided by ISP. OOE had been looking for a partner 
that could provide the required IT services with better quality and at lower costs right from the 
start of the contract. ISP agreed to deliver these services for a price OOE could afford, but that 
implied that the outsourcing contract was barely profitable for ISP. As a result of this and 
because there were hardly any incentives in the first contract for ISP to realize improvements, 
ISP didn’t have the (financial) latitude to act as a pro-active partner, but could only provide the 
agreed services as a (reactive) supplier. ISP also had to strictly manage the scope of the deli-
vered services and make sure that all additional services were charged to OOE. 
 
3. Related to the financial aspects mentioned previously, is the agreement between OOE and ISP 
to smoothen the annual service charges as part of the first contract. Although this was very 
attractive to OOE, because it could realize lower IT costs right from the start of the contract, the 
disadvantage of this agreement was that OOE didn’t benefit from the improvements in service 
delivery ISP realized. Instead, the annual IT costs of OOE increased, because of the requested 
additional services. 
 
In order to break out of this downward spiral of trust, OOE and ISP starting negotiating about a 
renewed contract early 2005. This resulted in the signing of a revised outsourcing contract in May 
2005, which actually extended the outsourcing relationship with another 3½ years. Apparently, ISP 
had been able to regain OOE’s trust in its competence and intentions in the period before signing 
the new contract, because when OOE’s trust hadn’t been regained, it would have been more likely 
that OOE had terminated the contract. Unfortunately I couldn’t find any clear evidence in the text 
fragments I collected, about what actually caused this turnaround, but the following text from a kick-
off presentation for the new contract (February 2005) in my sample at least shows the objectives of 
both parties: 
 
“Objective OOE: cost reduction; Request OOE to ISP: 
• Current scope ± € 12 M / year 
• Investigate in partnership mode : 
- Reduction of invoice ISP € 2 M – 4 € per year to take effect on 1st April 2005 
- Provide impact in scope, SLA, contract term / investment 
• Introduce bonus/malus in contract change 
 
Objective ISP: strengthen relationship, new contract period 
• Relationship 
- Strengthen relationship 
- OOE as reference 
• Financial 
- New charging structure to exceed the value of the current backlog of contracted service 
charges 
- SO target: 20% revenue reduction per tower 
• Contract 
- Clarify the services descriptions and remove ambiguity 
- Consolidate and simplify the large number of amendments 
- Improve efficiency of RFS process by accommodating service changes in a flexible way 
- Contract period extended by 3 years (end 2011)” 
 
In the engagement phase for the new contract, ISP proposed several solutions to reduce the costs, 
but OOE still had to pay the full price for implementing these solutions. It’s plausible that the main 
reason why ISP regained OOE’s trust was its willingness to reduce the annual service charges for 
OOE with more than 3 million euros without expecting compensating work in return. The IT depart-
ment of OOE was in a very difficult position at that time, because it had to cut down the IT costs, 
but this wasn’t really possible because of the outsourcing contract. Terminating the contract would 
imply many extra costs (termination and transition), while it was very uncertain whether OOE was 
able to save costs by insourcing the IT operations again. The willingness of ISP to negotiate about 
a new outsourcing contract that implied several losses and much less assured revenues for ISP 
convinced OOE that ISP was a trustworthy partner after all. During the engagement for the re-
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newed contract also improvements in the RFS process were agreed and it’s likely this contributed 
to the regain of OOE’s trust in ISP as well. 
5.3.2.3 RELATION BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TRUST 
Based on the results of the research conducted by Coletti, Sedatole and Towry (2005) one would 
expect that OOE’s trust in ISP had increased during the period of the first contract, because the 
control system setup for this contract induced close cooperation between both partners. In the pre-
vious section however I showed how OOE’s trust in SP declined in the period before the negotia-
tions for the second outsourcing contract started and that this was, at least partly, caused by ISP’s 
(bureaucratic) control systems. Apparently the research conducted by Coletti et al. didn’t take into 
account one or more relevant variables that influence the trust-building process they describe. I 
suspect that it’s not only relevant that the control system is strong enough to induce cooperation 
and that this cooperation is observed by the collaborators in order to enhance the level of trust 
among alliance partners, but that the control system designed for the alliance also matches the 
own control systems of the alliance partners. In this case there was a mismatch between the infor-
mal control systems of OOE and the bureaucratic control system for the outsourcing contract, 
which probably caused this contrary effect. 
 
Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom (2005) also investigated the dynamic interaction be-
tween trust and contract (see section 4.3.2). They suggest that when investigating the relation 
between trust and contract, the contract should be placed in its social context and within the rela-
tionship’s development. Looking at the social context of both contracts it seems that OOE is more 
dependent on ISP than vice versa. As a result of this asymmetric dependency and the ample expe-
rience of ISP in the area of IT outsourcing, ISP has been dominating the contract negotiations and 
execution. Although I didn’t study the contracts in detail, they seem to be mainly meant for ISP as a 
technical aid to manage the relationship and to make sure the business cases behind these con-
tracts are effectuated. This is just a consequence of the way in which ISP, as a bureaucratic orga-
nization, normally operates. I didn’t find any evidence in the documentation I studied that ISP used 
its position with regard to OOE and the contracts to maximize its benefits at the cost of OOE. On 
the other hand it seems that OOE is not considering the contracts (at least the first one) as a 
means for coordination. Apparently OOE, as an informal organization, is threatened by the exten-
siveness of the contract and thinks ISP is mainly using the contract as a safeguard against oppor-
tunistic behavior of OOE. OOE was looking for a partner to help it in performing its IT operations 
and probably expected that this partner would operate in the same informal way as OOE was used 
to operate itself. The elaborate contract that was created by ISP was interpreted by OOE as a sign 
of distrust and caused OOE to call ISP’s intentions into question. During the execution of the first 
contract, these doubts were confirmed by the laborious handling of requests for additional services. 
 
Considering the causes of the downward spiral of OOE’s trust in ISP I identified in the previous 
section, I have to conclude that OOE and ISP were also aware of these problems, because they 
seem to have dealt with these problems in the second contract. Of course, there was the advan-
tage when negotiating the second contract that both parties already had been cooperating closely 
for about three years. It seems especially OOE learned that the extensiveness of the outsourcing 
contract was not necessarily a sign of distrust of ISP towards OOE, but was mainly an aid to man-
age the cooperation. This was supported by the concessions ISP made to OOE in order to lower 
the annual service charges, which was the main driver for OOE to renegotiate the contract anyway. 
When comparing both outsourcing contracts especially the changes in the appendices with regard 
to the services, the charges and service level credits and bonuses are notable. Although I didn’t 
perform a full analysis of the differences, it’s plausible that the changes in these appendices reflect 
the results of the negotiations to reduce the annual service charges by reorganizing several service 
delivery activities. Besides these main changes, the annual service charges now show a slight de-
crease during the contract period, which seems to address the third problem I mentioned before. 
Finally, the charges appendix now also contains an exhibit about ‘gain share’, which is intended to 
encourage proposing improvements to the services and for both parties to benefit financially from 
the results of such improvements. This addition was supported by a different setup of the service 
level credits and bonuses appendix containing more incentives for ISP to continuously improve the 
execution of the service delivery activities. These incentives address the second problem. 
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Although OOE and ISP seem to have dealt with the identified problems in the second contract, this 
renewed contract is still as elaborate as the first one. This wasn’t however an impediment for OOE 
to sign this renewed contract. This subscribes to the point of view of Klein Woolthuis et al. that the 
mere completeness of a contract is not a decisive factor for the level of trust, but that one should 
also look at the intentions with which the contract is drawn up and the actual use of the contract. To 
this conclusion, I would like to add that especially the way in which one contracting party views and 
experiences the intentions and use of the contract by the other party is relevant. Apparently, OOE 
got convinced during the negotiations about the renewed contract that ISP mainly intends the con-
tract as a means for coordination and not as a safeguard against opportunism. This was likely due 
to the concessions ISP made towards OOE during the negotiations, but also because OOE was 
more used to the way ISP operates than during the negotiations of the first contract. It’s therefore 
safe to conclude that this changed believe of OOE in the intentions of ISP regarding the out-
sourcing contract and relationship was the main cause that the trust of OOE in ISP was reestab-
lished and as a result of this the new contract was signed. Considering this process from ISP’s 
point of view, I conclude that ISP actually used the contract as a means to regain OOE’s trust. 
Despite the substantial losses ISP had to take in order to win the new contract, the outlook for a 
strengthened relationship with OOE and the possibility to use OOE as a reference account in the 
future (see previous section) provided ISP with the legitimacy to engage into the negotiations with 
OOE for a renewed contract. 
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6. Conclusions 
The objective of this research was to contribute to the development of a theory on the dynamic 
relation between trust and control in the management of alliances by analyzing how the evolution of 
(dis)trust between partners in an alliance influences the contents of a renewed contract, when 
alliance partners agree to continue their relationship (see section 2.3). Considering the changes in 
the renewed contract compared to the first contract in the case I studied for this research, I doubt 
whether these changes are related to the evolution of (dis)trust during the execution of the first 
contract. It’s normal that when parties agree to renew a contract, they evaluate the execution of the 
former contract and make changes in the new contract in order to prevent the kind of problems that 
occurred before. It seems in this case the changes in the new contract were a result of the lessons 
both parties learned during the first contracting period. Based on the theory on the relation between 
trust and contract, one might have expected, for example, the removal of safeguarding clauses 
from the contract in order to positively affect the level of trust. I didn’t find however any such 
changes at all. From this finding the conclusion seems justified that the evolution of (dis)trust in an 
alliance doesn’t necessarily influence the contents of the renewed contract when partners agree to 
continue the alliance. This conclusion is only valid however when taking only the ‘letter’ of the con-
tract into account. In the case that was subject of my research, the decline of trust during the first 
contracting period did have an impact on the ‘spirit’ of the new contract. With this spirit of the con-
tract, I want to refer to the belief or conviction an alliance partner has regarding the intentions of the 
other partner with the usage of the contract. In this case the design of the first outsourcing contract 
was led by ISP and OOE believed that ISP intended to use the contract as a safeguard against 
opportunism and thus interpreted the contract as a sign of distrust. This belief caused a downward 
spiral of trust during the first contracting period. This downward spiral was turned for the better 
when the negotiations for the new contract started. It’s plausible that the mere fact that ISP was 
willing to negotiate about a drastic cut-down of the annual service charges caused OOE to change 
its belief in ISP’s intentions with the usage of contract, although the design of the new contract was 
again led by ISP. This change was supported by the experience OOE had in cooperating with ISP 
in the previous years and the considerable losses ISP had to take in order to have OOE sign a new 
outsourcing contract for seven years.  
 
This conclusion is in line with the conclusion of Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) that when investigating 
the relation between trust and contract also the intentions with which the contract is drawn up and 
the actual use of the contract should be taken into account. My conclusion however adds an extra 
dimension to the conclusion of Klein Woolthuis et al. I agree with Klein Woolthuis et al. that the in-
tentions with which the contract is drawn up and the actual use of the contract are relevant, but 
they don’t explicitly take into account that perceived intentions and use are very subjective. The 
(subjective) belief of an alliance partner regarding the (perceived) intentions of the other partner 
with the usage of the contract seems to play an important role in the evolution of (dis)trust. In the 
case I studied for this research one of the alliance partners even used the contract itself in trying to 
change the perception of the other partner about his intentions. I don’t rule out that Klein Woolthuis 
et al. already had this subjective aspect in mind when concluding that the contract should be 
placed in its social context and within the relationship’s development, but at least I want to empha-
size this subjective aspect. Although my conclusion is only a small addition to the scientific body of 
knowledge in this area, it points to some interesting options for further research. First, it might be 
interesting to investigate which factors determine this subjective belief regarding the intentions of 
the alliance partner. From this research it seems that the culture of the organization and the 
perceived attitude of the alliance partner play a significant role, but it’s likely that other factors are 
important as well. Once (some of) these factors are identified, it might also be interesting to investi-
gate how an alliance partner can appropriately influence the subjective belief of the intended part-
ner in its intensions with the usage of the contract. 
 
Besides the suggestions for further research regarding the relation between trust and contract, I 
also have a suggestion with regard to the methodology used in this research. While performing the 
content analysis on the collected documents I sometimes felt like a forensic researcher trying to 
reconstruct the events with the evidence found at a crime scene. This also made me wonder 
whether content analysis as a methodology can learn from the methods and techniques applied 
with forensic research (and vice versa). I didn’t investigate whether methodologists already tried to 
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incorporate forensic science methods and techniques into content analysis, but if this hasn’t been 
investigated, it might be worthwhile to do so. 
 
Before finishing this thesis, I want to point the reader to some limitations of my research. Because 
this case study concerns a period of several years in the past, it was difficult to reconstruct what 
actually happened during this period. It wouldn’t suffice to interview key informants, because some 
key informants are not available anymore for interview and the remaining informants will likely have 
problems recalling the events. Even when the informants can accurately recall the events, their 
answers will probably be (politically) biased. To cope with these problems, I decided to apply con-
tent analysis on the documents regarding the outsourcing contract collected by the IT service pro-
vider. This approach proved to be satisfactory for studying the process of the development of 
(dis)trust during a period in the past. By using the information recorded in the documents, there is 
no dependency anymore on the fallible memory and personal interests of involved persons and 
because the information was recorded for other purposes than to assess the development of 
(dis)trust, it’s not likely that the information is biased with regard to this subject. The use of docu-
ments also improves the reliability of the research, because by following the research process 
described in chapter 5, the results of this research are reproducible. The fact however, that the 
studied documents were created for other purposes than to answer my research questions, is also 
a major drawback of this method. After all, the context used to study the documents was different 
from the context in which these documents were created. This implies I had to interpret the selec-
ted text fragments with regard to this different context, which introduces some subjectivity. This 
subjectivity also played a role in the way I selected and analyzed the documents and text frag-
ments, because I was probably biased by the discussions I had with some people involved in this 
contract when I was looking for a suitable case to investigate and when I was collecting the docu-
ments. Despite that, I’m confident about my assessment of the development of (dis)trust, because I 
used several types of documents (triangulation) and the analysis results from these documents 
were converging. Another drawback of the applied research method is the information overload. 
Although I only studied one case and from this case only the documents stored by one outsourcing 
partner, the initial amount of collected information was huge. Because I decided, that is was not 
appropriate, regarding the time and budget constraints of this research, to use data analysis 
software, I could only study a very limited set of documents. Therefore, I might have overlooked 
probable causes that explain the downward spiral of trust during the execution of the first contract 
and the restore of trust during the negotiations for the second contract. 
 
Despite these limitations, I’m still confident that my contribution to the theory on the dynamic rela-
tion between trust and control in alliances is useful due to the explorative type of my research. That 
my conclusion is a logical extension to the theory of respectable scholars like Klein Woolthuis et al. 
confirms this confidence. 
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Appendix B. Overview Lotus Notes databases 
A large part of the documentation regarding the IT outsourcing contract between the outsourcing 
organization (OOE) and the IT service provider (ISP) that has been investigated, was stored by ISP 
in nine Lotus Notes databases, each of which was archived on a CD. Besides these archived data-
bases I was also granted access to three current Lotus Notes databases regarding the execution of 
the outsourcing contract. In one of the current databases I found yet another archived database 
concerning the period before the first contract was closed. The following sections describe the 
contents of these databases in general. 
OOE Workroom 
Description 
 
Database size 147 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   224 
Accessible: 224 
Regular:  160 
Period 25/01/2001 – 07/12/2001 
State Archived (in OOE NL Teamroom on 12-10-2004) 
Communication 
Types 
Active 
ADM 
Development 
Docs JV team 
Files for inspiration 
Final (issued) 
Finished 
Human Resources 
ISP Internal 
IGNS Schedules (contract) 
Joint Verification 
Midrange 
Pricing 
Procurement / Contracts 
Proposal 
SSO 390 TE 
Working documents 
Categories 01. Proposal 
02. Joint Verification 
03. Planning 
04. Minutes and Actionlists 
05. Contracts 
06. Customer data 
07. Presentations 
08. Team  
09. QA 
10. Separate files 
11. Thingies 
OOE Transition AD/M 
Description This is where the team defines itself, and defines the scope and 
vocabulary of its work.... 
Database size 27 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   52 
Accessible: 52 
Regular:  42 
Period 11/12/2001 – 19/04/2002 
State Archived 
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Communication 
Types 
Discussion 
Meeting Minutes 
Procedure 
Project Plan 
Reference 
Categories Cross Competency 
General 
Procedures Manual 
Transition BE 
Transition SLO 
OOE Transition Infrastructure 
Description Enable communication for Infra Transition activities OOE. 
Database size 449 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   713 
Accessible: 713 
Regular:  612 
Period 02/11/2001 – 13/07/2004 
State Archived 
Communication 
Types 
Action Item 
Discussion 
Reference 
Categories 00 Standards & Procedures 
01 Organisation & People 
02 Planning and Estimating 
04 Progress Tracking 
05 Progress Reviewing 
06 Progress Reporting 
07 Risk Management 
08 Change Management 
14 Base Information 
16 Contract Management 
17 Supplier Management 
18 Competency Data 
19 Lotus Notes Base Information 
20 Lotus Notes Project Information 
21 Lotus Notes Progress Report 
22 Lotus Notes Meetings 
23 Extranet Project Base Information 
24 Extranet Project Project Information 
25 Extranet Project Progress Reports 
26 Extranet Project Meetings 
27 Extranet Risk Management 
28 Extranet Change Management 
29 LN Phase 2 Base Information 
30 LN Phase 2 Project Information 
32 LN Phase 2 Meetings 
35 Blue Martini Base Information 
36 Blue Martini Project Information 
37 Blue Martini Progress Reports 
38 Blue Martini Meetings 
41 OMS Base Information 
42 OMS Project Information 
43 OMS Meetings 
44 OMS Change and Risk Management 
45 Extranet Improvement Phase 1 - Project Base Information 
48 WMQ On SAP First+ Base Information 
49 WMQ On SAP First+ Project Information 
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50 WMQ On SAP First+ Progress Reports 
51 SAP First+ Base Information 
52 SAP First+ Project Information 
Program Operations Support Tool (POST) for OOE 
Description The Program Management Plan -  Program Operations Support Tool 
(POST), is a Lotus Notes application. The audience for this database is 
ISP's Strategic Outsourcing PEs along with their operations and 
management teams. 
Database size 42 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   3,308 
Accessible: ? 
Period ? 
State Archived 
Categories ? 
Notes No access to several documents and sections! 
OOE POST v1 
Description 
 
Database size 32 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
? 
Period ? 
State Archived 
Categories ? 
Notes No access to database! 
Same database as in previous Section? 
OOE Engagement Teamroom 
Description Goal of the OOE Engagement Teamroom is to collect all information which 
is mandatory for a succesfull execution of the PMP processes managed by 
the SCBO. POST is the managing tool which is refering to the documents 
in this engagement teamroom. 
Furthermore, valuable information for managing the POST Processes can 
be added into this database. 
Goal of the OOE Engagement TR is to meet the: 
- transition obligations ISP agreed to OOE and continuing meanwhile the 
agreed services 
- ISP targets for performance, revenue, profit and business growth related 
to the OOE SO Contract MM1D057 and related Amendments, SOW's 
etc 
by providing the ISP Project Executive for OOE with a PE Management 
System ensuring effective operations. 
Database size 523 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   1,670 
Accessible: 1,670 
Regular:  1,590 
Period 24/06/2002 – 24/01/2005 
State Archived 
Communication 
Types 
Business Development 
Customer event 
Meeting ISP internal 
Overview 
Reference 
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RFS 
Categories RFS 2002 
RFS Closed 
RFS Lost/Cancelled 
TR010 - Account Management 
TR020 - Customer Request Management 
TR110 - SO Contract 
TR120 - EBH Contract 
Win Amendments 
Win PWO 
Win SoW 
OOE Engagement Teamroom (2) 
Description To speed op the engagement for OOE by consolidating all the proposal 
documentation. 
ALL documentation related to proposals, RFS's, amendments and bids is 
supposed to be inserted in this database. 
Database size 169 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   323 
Accessible: 323 
Regular:  159 
Period 22/01/2004 – 30/08/2004 
State Archived 
Document Types Action Item 
Comment 
Meeting 
Reference 
Categories Approvals 
Customer Interaction 
Requirements & Scope 
RFS 
Sent to Customer 
Status 
OOE Service Management Infrastructure 
Description 
 
Database size 274 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   216 
Accessible: 216 
Regular:  206 
Period 27/11/2001 – 18/12/2003 
State Archived 
Communication 
Types 
D01 – Organisation and Management 
D02 – Presentations 
D04 – Contract Documentation 
D05 – Solution Design 
D06 – Meeting Minutes 
D07 – Templates 
S01 – Change Management 
S02 – Cost Control 
S05 – Helpdesk 
S06 – KPI and SLR 
S07 – Performance and Capacity Management 
S09 – Incident Management 
S10 – Security Management 
S11 – Network 
S12 – Hardware and Software 
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S13 – Service Reviews and Benchmarking 
Categories Documentation 
Service Management 
OOE Service Management AD/M 
Description 
 
Database size 1,485 KB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
? 
Period ? 
State Archived 
Communication 
Types 
? 
Categories 
 
Notes No access to database! 
OOE Delivery Teamroom 
Description Goal of the OOE Delivery is to meet the: 
- transition obligations ISP agreed to OOE and continuing meanwhile the 
agreed services 
- ISP targets for performance, revenue, profit and business growth related 
to the OOE SO Contract MM1D057 and related Amendments, SOW's 
etc 
by providing the ISP Project Executive for OOE with a PE Management 
System ensuring effective operations. 
Database size 524 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   1,159 
Accessible: 1,159 
Regular:  1,099 
Period 21/09/2001 – 06/01/2004 
State Archived 
Communication 
Types 
Baselines 
Business Controls 
Business Development 
Claims and Complaints 
Contract Calendar 
Contract Changes 
Contract Management 3rd Parties 
Contract Performance 
Correspondence ISP Internal 
Correspondence to Customer 
Customer Satisfaction 
Deliverables 
Delivery Initiation 
Disputes 
Documents 
E-BH 
Finances – Change Requests 
Finances – Input Files 
Finances – Invoicing 
Finances – Justifications 
Finances – Orders 
Finances – Rules 
Finances – Set-up 
Finances – Sources 
Finances – Systems 
Overview Lotus Notes databases 50
 
 Trust-Contract dynamics in IT outsourcing: a case study Date: 21-06-2008  
Version: 1.0 (Final) 
 
Finances 
ISP 
Issues 
Meetings ISP Internal 
Meetings with Customer 
OOE 
Procedures Customer Facing 
Procedures ISP Internal 
Programme Governance 
Programme Security 
Programme Staff 
Programme Technology 
Project Close-outs 
Project Control 
Project Governance 
Project Plans 
Project Procedures 
Project Security 
Project Staff 
Project Technology 
Reference 
RFS-SES 
Risks 
Suppliers 
Work at Risk 
Categories TR010 – Engagement for MM1D057 
TR011 – Engagement for Amendments ETC 
TR020 – Contracts 
TR030 – Programme Management 
TR040 – PE Office 
TR050 – Communication 
TR060 – HR 
TR070 – Contract Start-up 
TR080 – Transition Infrastructure 
TR090 – Transition AD/M 
TR100 – Service Operations Infrastructure 
TR110 – Service Operations AD/M 
TR121 – Project Infra LN MMCC002 
TR122 – Project Infra Extranet MCC016 
TR900 – Standards 
TR990 – Teamroom Administration 
TRA020 – Contracts 
TRA030 – Programme Management 
TRA040 – PE Office 
TRA060 – HR 
TRA070 – Contract Start-up 
TRA080 – Transition Infrastructure 
TRA090 – Transition AD/M 
TRA100 – Service Operations Infrastructure 
TRA110 – Service Operations AD/M 
OOE NL Teamroom 
Description 
 
Database size 1,182 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   1,208 
Accessible: 1,087 
Regular:  807 
Period 22/01/2002 – 13/11/2007 
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State Current 
Document Types Discussion 
Meeting 
Milestone 
Reference 
Categories 10. Business Office/Administration 
10. Business Office/Business Controls 
10. Business Office/Business Controls/Compliance Tests 
10. Business Office/Business Controls/SACA 
10. Business Office/General 
10. Business Office/WAR 
1. Algemeen/About OOE 
1. Algemeen/ISP/OOE Account Team 
2A. Pre-RFS Fase 
2B. Engagement Fase 
2D. BAU Fase 
2. RFS 
2. RFS/Amendments Signed 
2. RFS/Lost/Cancelled 
2. RFS/SOW Signed 
4. Meetings 
4. Meetings/Customer/2003 
4. Meetings/Customer/2004 
4. Meetings/Internal/2003 
4. Meetings/ Internal /2004 
5. Account Management/2004 Cust. Sat. Crisis 
5. Account Management/Account Management 
5. Account Management/Delivery Initiation 
5. Account Management/Signature and Pipeline 
6. Contract Management 
6. Contract Management/Baselines 
6. Contract Management/Signed Contracts 
7. Financial Management 
7. Financial Management/Budgets 
7. Financial Management/Invoicing 
7. Financial Management/KWO-Check 
7. Financial Management/Monthly Reports 
7. Financial Management/Project Control and Coordination 
7. Financial Management/Reference 
8. Procedures/Processen 
9. Architecture Tools and Templates 
9. Architecture Workproducts 
Algemeen 
Algemeen/About OOE 
Algemeen/Discussions 
Algemeen/ISP/OOE Account Team 
Alg. info dept. SO/ISD/AMS 
Architecture 
Business Office/Administration 
Business Office/Business Controls 
Business Office/Business Controls/Compliance Tests 
Business Office/Business Controls/SACA 
Business Office/General 
Claim 
Client Satisfaction 
Contract Management 
Contract Management/Baselines 
Customer Correspondence 
Delegaties 
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Financial Management 
Financial Management/Claims en Disputes 
Financial Management/Invoicing 
Financial Management/Project Control and Coordination 
Financial Management/UER 
Financial Management/WAR’s 
Procedures/Processen 
QA 
RFS 
Signings/Algemeen 
Signings/Main Contract 
Signings/Signed RFS’en 
OOE RALLY Teamroom 
Description 
 
Database size 185 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   172 
Accessible: 171 
Regular:  114 
Period 04/02/2005 – 11/06/2005 
State Current 
Document Types Action Item 
Discussion 
Reference 
Categories Baseline current 
Bidmanagement 
Contracts in progress 
Contracts old 
ISP review 
ISP sign-off 
Meeting minutes 
Presentation extern 
Presentation intern 
Project doc’s 
SAcase tree 
Solution design 
OOE Transition 
Description 
 
Database size 382 MB 
Number of Notes 
documents 
Total:   593 
Accessible: 593 
Regular:  522 
Period 31/05/2005 – 28/03/2006 
State Current 
Document Types Action Item 
Discussion 
Meeting 
Milestone 
Reference 
Categories 00 Standards and Procedures 
01 Organization People and Resources 
02 Milestones 
03 Plans and actuals 
04 Meetings 
05 Risks 
06 Changes 
07 Issues 
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08 Delivery 
09 Sponsor Information 
10 Supplier Information 
11 Requirements 
12 Quality 
Financials 
Lessons Learned 
Team Operations 
 
